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Summary 
This paper presents an overview of the risk literature, concentrating on general 
approaches to risk analysis and risk assessment. We believe that this is an essential 
first step towards the setting of guidelines or the adoption of a regulatory procedure for 
all situations where risk to humans and their environment is involved. We have used 
the term environmental risk to encompass these situations. Of necessity, political risk 
is also a factor. 
The main points made in the paper are reviewed here under their original chapter 
headings. 
Chapter 3. What do we mean by risk and uncertainty? 
Risk aryl. uncertainty are an integral part of all decisions 
made in the real world. The decision-making process 
involves a set of actions and outcomes, each of which have 
a probability associated with them. The distinction between 
risk and uncertainty hinges on the ability of 'experts' to 
agree on a set of probabilities (risk estimates) for the set of 
possible outcomes. The characteristics of risk are 
therefore, a choice of action, a magnitude of loss, and a 
chance of loss. 
The magnitude of the risk is determined by its character 
(type), extent (size) and timing. .only part of this 
magnitude can be quantified in commensurate units: 
assessments of magnitude are heavily value laden. 
The probability, or chance of loss can be measured in 
different ways. Thus, four types of risk can be 
distinguished: real risk, statistical risk, predicted risk and 
perceived risk. Real risk cannot be measured. The term 
'actual'risk usually refers to statistical or predicted risk. 
Although the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' risk are 
often used to describe risk, the calculation of 'objective' 
risk estimates requires value judgements and assumptions 
which mean that they need not be consistent. 
(i) 
Chapter 4. Approaches to risk - what is risk analysis? 
Risk perception is concerned not only with perceived risk as 
described earlier, but with all aspects of individual and 
group perceptions of risk. Risk perceptions are affected by 
a large number of factors, including the voluntariness of 
the risk, the expectation of control, the severity of the 
consequences, the equity of distribution of risk and benefits, 
and the perceived benefit itself. There does not appear to 
have been any adequate work done on the ranking of these 
factors. 
Risk assessment may be broken down into risk 
determination, incorporating risk identification and risk 
estimation, and risk evaluation which is the explicit social 
evaluation of the risk. However, risk determination includes 
implicit social judgements, for example in the value of life 
calculation. Value judgements are also used with regard to 
the necessary assumptions involved in the technical 
estimation. 
Methods of risk estimation include direct statistical 
estimates, modelling procedures using historical and 
experimental data, and risk comparisons. 
Risk evaluation applies selected criteria to a project before 
making a decision. These criteria may be quantitative, or 
qualitative, or most likely, a combination of both. 
Examples of methods include risk comparisons, cost 
effectiveness of risk reduction, cost-risk-benefit analysis 
and combined systems. 
Acceptable risk is an emotive term used to represent a level 
which society believes is 'good enough'. A more detailed 
analysis, however, suggests that risks are not acceptable, 
but options are. We are really talking about accepted risk. 
There is no such thing as a safe risk. Methods used to 
determine acceptable risk are similar to the methods of risk 
evaluation. 
( ii) 
Risk preference approaches are used to try to measure 
perceived risk, which can be used as an estimate of 
accepted risk for risk comparisons. The revealed 
preference method uses statistics of behaviour to infer 
underlying preferences. This approach assumes that 
present and past accepted levels of safety are applicable to 
the future. The expressed preference method obtains 
information directly from individuals. It assumes that 
people fully understand the implications of the questions, 
and that they will behave consistently and rationally. 
Risk management is often used as a catch-all: phrase. 
More specifically it is concerned with examining the policy 
options with a view to decision making. Problems arise 
when politicians and decision makers become remote from 
the technical process involved in estimating the risk. 
Chapter 5. Experience with risk assessment 
Essential additional steps to the risk assessment process 
involve the implementation and communicationaf the 
chosen option, and the monitoring of the outcomes. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is the technical 
process of risk determination. Some form of risk 
assessment should be a required step for any project where 
there is the potential of harm to humans or the 
environment. 
The media is often criticised for biasing reports and 
unnecessarily frightening the public. However, it has 
become increasingly obvious that the members of the public 
'want to know' and do not believe that things are being done 
for 'their own good' unless they have the option to take part 
in the decision-making process. The media have a very 
important part to play in informing the public, and ways in 
which their performance can be improved need to be 
investigated. 
The conflict between perceived risk and actual risk is often 
based on values rather than lack of information on the part 
of the public. It is only when specific interests are involved 
(iii) 
.' , 
that conflicts can be solved by means of compromise which 
may involve compensation or communication. 
The subjective nature of technical risk estimates must be 
explicitly recognised and clarified. Where estimates have 
been obtained by experimentation, then conditions of use in 
the real world must be taken account of in decision-making. 
Chapter 6. Alternative approaches to risk decision making 
The two main approaches to risk decision making are the 
adversary approach and the authoritative approach These 
are often used in combination with a consensus approach 
or a corporatist approach 
Historically, the United States, Japan and West Germany 
have used the adversary approach, which is cumbersome, 
time consuming and expensive but open to scrutiny~ and 
Great Britain and the Nederlands have used the 
authoritative approach which is efficient, but closed to the 
public. 
Experience with the use of regulation versus voluntary 
agreements in areas where risk is involved suggest that in 
general voluntary agreements do not work, and that 
regulation is required. Regulation must be monitored. 
Chapter Z Areas requiring further research 
Because of the increasing awareness of the problems of 
risk and uncertainty for humans and their environment, 
Further research into particular aspects of risk research 
which are' relevant to our particular circumstances should 
be initiated. 
Increasing public awareness and interest in projects 
involving risk requires that we carefully review our present 
institutional approach to risk in our environment. 
(iv) 
1.0 An introduction 
Risk is an important part of our everyday existence. We continually expose 
ourselves or are exposed to risk over which we may have little or no control. Our 
perception of the risks we encounter varies according to factors such as whether our 
exposure is voluntary or involuntary, how much control we feel we have over the 
risk, and whether or not we feel that the risk is 'fair'. 
Increased knowledge, as well as technological and institutional changes are giving us 
greater control over our environment and at the same time allowing us to modify it 
at a much faster rate than previously. The number of risks involved is increasing and 
as greater knowledge does not necessarily reduce total uncertainty, the magnitude of 
technological and environmental risk is also increasing. Man is now able to create 
his own catastrophic events, without the aid of God. Thus the danger of proceeding 
with new projects and activities without careful examination of the possible 
consequences is becoming increasingly apparent. Therefore, it is important that we 
make greater efforts to understand the risks involved in new projects and 
technologies so as to avert possible future disasters. 
Some of the types of risks we encounter as a society include environmental, 
psychological, physical, future oriented and political risk. It is noteworthy too that as 
well as having varying perception as to the degree of risk involved in a particular 
activity, individuals and groups have different perceptions if the types of risks 
involved. 
People concerned with the study of risk include philosophers, sociologists, business 
managers, economlsts, engineers and politicians. Of these, philosophers, sociologists 
and economists are concerned primarily with the characteristics of risk and choice 
under uncertainty, engineers are concerned with quantifying risk, whilst managers 
desire to manage and reduce risk. Politicians and decision makers rely on 
information obtained from the other groups to make decisions which will in part 
reflect the risks involved and in part be the result of other contributing factors. 
There are a number of different approaches to the study of risk which depend 
largely on the type of risk involved. Some of these include decision theory 
approaches which concentrate on the theory of choice under uncertainty and often 
involve specifying subjective probability functions in terms of expected values or 
expected utilities. Statistical risk and predicted risk measurement depend on 
specialised mathematical processes including systems theory, small sample statistics, 
reliability theory and extreme value theory. Other approaches try to measure 
peoples' perceptions with regard to risk using preference theory, and finally, there is 
a field which concentrates on attempting to quantify, in monetary terms, the value of 
a life. These approaches are often interdisciplinary by nature. 
Risk can be incurred either involuntarily or voluntarily and may involve individuals, 
social groups or communities. An individual may take a voluntary risk by choosing 
to put the washing out on a doubtful day having decided that the likely benefits are 
greater than the possible cost. A community (plant, animal or human) may be put at 
risk involuntarily as a result of a motorway routing decision. This latter example 
illustrates the distributional problem where the benefits resulting from a decision 
will affect one group (motorists predominantly from outside the area) whilst the 
costs fall on another group (present users or inhabitants). 
Risk has two major components: a probability of occurrence and a magnitude of loss 
(or gain). These two are often combined as an estimate of the value of the risk. 
Since the magnitudes are often noncommensurable, there is an obvious difficulty in 
comparing risks. 
Because we cannot eliminate risk from our society, a common objective in all risk 
studies and analyses is the reduction of risk, or the minimisation of loss 
(maximisation of gain). This is particularly important when we do not know with any 
certainty what the effect of our choosing a risky action is likely to be. The most 
appropriate way to reduce risk is by improving our understanding and thus 
increasing our ability to manipulate situations so as to get 'good' results. 
Rowe (1977) writes in the preface to his definitive book "An anatomy of risk" that his 
original objective was a three to four page paper on the subject of risk as an adjunct 
to a larger project. He found that every question posed, presupposed a further 10 
questions and the 'small' paper ended up as a 200-page monograph which took 18 
months to write (and was later extended to a 400-page book). My intention here was 
to summarise current thinking on risk and uncertainty in roughly 30 pages. My 
greater success (though exceeding 30 pages) will be due to basic theoretical surveys 
such as those prepared by Rowe (1977) and Rescher (1983), as well as a growing 
number of conference proceedings and short seminar reports on risk topics. These 
are mainly concerned with applied risk management and illustrate an increasing 
awareness of the problems associated with the presence of risk. 
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2 About this report 
The aim or goal of this information paper is to examine the problems caused by risk 
and uncertainty with particular reference to public sector decision making and 
environmental management, for the purpose of providing a basis on which proposals 
can be made for a consistent set of policy guidelines regarding risk analysis and risk 
assessment procedures. This paper will not attempt to detail these policy guidelines 
but will merely provide a rational and consistent basis from which they may be 
derived. 
Risk-related problems tend to enter the public domain when the magnitude of the 
potential outcome is so great that it might have possible severe or even catastrophic 
consequences for large land or sea areas or big population groups. These population 
groups may be identified by geographic, demographic or other social boundaries. 
Large development projects may be initiated by private enterprise but often require 
governmental approval before development can proceed. Obtaining this approval 
may involve seeking a direct political decision or alternatively, a public hearing may 
be required. This introduces the concept of public participation. The conflict 
between technological estimates of risk and the public perception of the same risk is 
a very important element in this area. 
Many businesses incur risk on a smaller scale which does not require recourse to the 
public decision-making process but which may have potentially harmful effects on 
the surrounding environment or a particular section of the population. Difficulties 
occur when the population at risk cannot be identified geographically, but is 
associated demographically, socially, or by occupation. Uncertainty associated with 
the risk may not be recognised and this may lead to potentially disastrous situations. 
Current examples of this include the thalidomide tragedy, with its international 
repercussions, and the continuing arguments regarding the use of 2,4,5-T. If harmful 
~ffects do occur, then often the public becomes involved through litigation, such as 
in the case of the Dalkon shield law suits. The international aspects of these 
incidents and the difficulties and inequities resulting from the different legal and 
institutional arrangements in the different countries involved suggest a need for an 
international approach to risk management procedures. 
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The specific objectives of this paper are theretore: 
(1) to examine the literature relating to risk and uncertainty, looking 
at the different approaches and attitudes taken by philosophers, 
social scientists, economists, engineers and private and public 
sector decision makers; 
(2) to summarise present concepts of risk and uncertainty, paying 
attention to individual disciplinary goals, to provide a framework 
for further understanding; 
(3) to briefly survey related areas such as pul?lic perception, social 
attitudes to risk including the value of life discussion and the 
insurance mechanism; 
(4) to critically examine some examples of quantitative risk 
assessment, concentrating mainly on European and North on 
European and North American experience; 
(5) to categorise risk assessment procedures; and 
( 6) to propose areas for further research. 
As a basis for pursuing these objectives the following questions have been posed. 
(1) What are risk and uncertainty and how can we characterise 
them? 
(2) How do we analyse risk? 
(3) How can we manage risk? 
(4) Is there such a thing as acceptable risk? 
(5) What lessons can be learnt from international experience? 
(6) Should the Ministry for the Environment adopt a specific 
regulatory attitude towards risk and uncertainty? 
(7) Which areas require further investigation with particular regard 
to the New Zealand context? 
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Question one is considered in Chapter three. Questions two through four are dealt 
with in Chapter four, and separate chapters are devoted to questions five, six and 
seven. The final chapter summarises the main points of the paper. An appendix 
contains a list of the definitions or terminology developed through the paper. This is 
consistent with, although not identical, to proposals made by the Royal Society Study 
Group (1983). It was their wish, which we endorse, to promote consistent use of 
terminology in risk studies and risk assessment projects. 
There is emphasis throughout this report on the need for greater understanding of 
the risk process and improved communication between the 'experts', the decision 
makers, the groups who are at risk, and the public at large. A major part of risk 
management is concerned with conflict resolution, and this aspect has been the 
subject of a number of recent papers and reports by eminent risk researchers. 
The prime intention behind this report is to present an overview of the risk literature 
as a means of providing a consistent base for the further study and proposal of a 
mechanism for the setting of regulations and procedures appropriate to risk 
management as a part of the public decision-making process in New Zealand. 
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3.0 What do we mean by risk and uncertainty? 
There have been attempts to classify risk according to a variety of criteria. This is 
useful only if the classification is relevant to the intended application. Although this 
paper is concerned mainly with the problems of risk and uncertainty in the public 
area, the lessons from management and classic decision theory are useful. If we 
adopt the position of a decision maker, then all decisions in the real world involve a 
degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty may be part of the environment in which the 
decision is being made or it may be connected with the outcomes resulting from the 
actions or decisions themselves. Outcomes in this context may have financial, social 
or environmental implications. For any particular system under study there may be 
descriptive uncertainty or uncertainty with regard to the variables defining the 
system, and measurement uncertainty which is uncertainty with regard to the value 
of the variables. From this derives the information paradox that as uncertainty with 
respect to the variables is resolved, uncertainty with regard to valuing the variables is 
introduced. Similarly, reducing uncertainty does not mean that the risk will be 
reduced, and, as we will see later, reducing risk in one area may in fact introduce 
further risk in another. 
The decision-making process begins with the decision that a problem exists, and in 
any decision-making process there will be a number of value elements about which 
value judgements must be made. These judgements are necessary because there is 
seldom a commonly accepted 'correct' approach. Rowe (1977) divides these value 
judgements into three groups: 
(1) technical value judgements; 
(2) social value judgements; and 
(3) managerial value judgements. 
Technical value judgements are important, since very often the 'experts' who make 
technical risk estimates do not recognise that these estimates are in fact value 
judgements because of the uncertainties and assumptions involved in their 
calculation. Social and managerial value judgements are more readily accepted as 
such because they are generally more open to scrutiny by external observers. 
Often there is no valid basis for comparing or classifying different risks because we 
are concerned with unique events which require us to make both an estimate of the 
risk and a value judgement about the reliability of the estimate. Therefore we need 
to look for social preference information and utility estimates which measure the 
social values associated with the decision components. Events resulting from 
decisions are assigned probabilities, and behavioural patterns and attitudes towards 
risk affect the criteria used to select from the different possible outcomes. Two key 
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components of the process of risk assessment are risk determination, which 
identifies and quantifies the risk in terms of likelihood of occurrence, and risk 
evaluation which estimates acceptable levels and considers methods of avoiding or 
controlling risk. 
3.1 Distinction between risk and uncertainty 
Risk and uncertainty are often treated as synonymous, however, there is a distinction 
which needs to be understood, even if under most circumstances it does not have to 
be preserved. In a decision-making context, risk and uncertainty are associated with 
actions and outcomes. The three basic elements of risk are: 
(1) a choice of action or an exposure to loss; 
(2) a negativity of outcome or magnitude of loss; and 
(3) a chance of realisation or chance of loss. 
Elements (2) and (3) may alternatively be referred to as the existence of possible 
unwanted ·consequences and an uncertainty as to the o'ccurrence of these 
consequences. Risk can also be associated with gain, particularly in financial 
management concerns. In this paper we will generally refer to loss and assume that 
man is by nature risk averse (although we will later see that this can depend upon the 
certainty of the loss or gain). We can then adopt Rowe's (1977) definitions of risk: 
that· 
"Risk is the potential for realisation of unwanted negative 
consequences of an event''; and 
"Risk aversion is action taken to control risk". 
,Decision analysis uses decision trees to present choices as actions and outcomes. 
Figure 1 shows a simple example of a decision tree with two choices. 
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··°1 
a1 
--··°2 
03 
A~ 
P24 
a2__ = P2S 
-·°4 
----Os 
Figure 1: Simple decision tree. 
A is the decision point and a 1 and a2 are the alternative actions which may be taken 
at this point. 01, 02 .. Os represent the outcomes eventuating from these actions 
and Pi· is the probability of outcome j resulting from action i. For each action the 
sum 01 the probabilities is unity. In this small example the five possible outcomes 
are shown as being unique, however, it is possible for the outcomes to overlap so 
that one outcome may be able to reached from several actions. 
Following Baker (1984) the characteristics of decision making under uncertainty can 
be summarised as: 
(1) that the physical outcome (or value attached to the physical 
outcome) of some action is not completely known beforehand; 
(2) that the uncertainty (associated with the outcome) may be 
affected by the action taken; 
(3) that each action has an associated set of possible outcomes each 
with a probability or likelihood that only one of these outcomes 
will eventuate; and 
( 4) a decision is a choice between actions. 
It is important to remember that the probabilities associated with the outcomes are 
not strictly mathematical probabilities as defined using long-run average likelihood. 
Mathematical probability is not relevant to one-off and behavioural situations. For 
example, when tossing a single die, the long run probability of throwing a four is one 
sixth. This relates to the expected number of fours which would be obtained over a 
large number of throws. This probability has very little relevance when only a single 
throw is being made. When we are considering much less likely events, for example 
the 50-year flood, where the probability estimate has been made using small sample 
statistics or modelling techniques, such probabilities are even more irrelevant. 
Therefore we introduce the concept of a subjective probability. This measures a 
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'strength of belief' that a particular outcome will occur. The difference between 
objective and subjective probabilities is referred to later in the context of defining 
different types of risk. 
The difficulty of working with small probabilities becomes a very practical one when 
we are considering 'safe' dose calculations. In most cases lower limits are deduced 
by extrapolating from experimental data relating to higher dose experiments, 
because the number of experimental subjects required to test for very low dose 
exposure would be astronomical. Thus there is no experimental data available to 
confirm or refute the predictions made. 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty hinges on the probabilities of 
occurrence. We say that a risky situation is one where the set of possible outcomes is 
well known and where a probability distribution for these outcomes can be agreed 
upon by a set of 'relevant experts' (this probability distribution may be objective or 
subjective). An uncertain situation occurs when either the set of outcomes is 
unknown (uncertainty with respect to the environment in which the decision is being 
made) or where agreement as to a probability distribution cannot be reached. 
Some writers, including Hertz and Thomas (1983a), expand this distinction to 
include strategic risk and tactical risk. Strategic decision-making situations involve 
strategic uncertainty or uncertainty about the structure of the problem as well as its 
outcome, and strategic risk is therefore particularly pertinent to the public 
decision-making process. 
Another dimension to the distinction between risk and uncertainty is that the 
uncertainty does not imply risk if there are no direct consequences to the individual 
or decision maker. Uncertainty is therefore a necessary condition for risk, but it is 
not sufficient and, as stated earlier, reducing uncertainty in a system does not 
necessarily reduce risk. 
3.2 Risk versus hazard 
The terms hazard and risk are sometimes also confused. Following Covello et al. 
(1981), hazards are threats to humans and what they value. Hazardousness is 
therefore a description of those threats in terms of a causal sequence of events, and 
risks are quantitative measures of hazard consequences. Risk identification is 
therefore equivalent to hazard identification. Lee (1981) defines a hazard as a 
situation or activity involving events where consequences are undesirable to some 
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unknown degree and where future occurrence is uncertain. We would refer to this 
as a risky situation. An occupational hazard arises when conditions in the workplace 
put workers at additional risk, often in an indirect manner. For example, uranium 
mine workers in Canada who are also smokers show rates of lung cancer which are 
considerably greater than those of smokers in the general population. This is an 
interesting example of a combination of voluntary and involuntary risk. 
3.3 Characteristics of risk 
The three components of risk were described in Section 3.1 as: 
(1) a choice of action (exposure to loss); 
(2) a chance of realisation; and 
(3) a magnitude of loss. 
The first of the three components concerns the alternatives that risk may be 
voluntary or involuntary. Individuals and groups voluntarily take risks, often without 
explicitly recognising that they are risks. Economists are generally not concerned 
with the choices or preferences expressed by these actions. They use the theory of 
choice as a tool in exploring other aspects of welfare economics, for example. 
Behavioural scientists, however, are interested in the choices and attitudes, and use 
questionnaires to elicit information on individual and group behaviour. Involuntary 
risks occur when an individual or group is put 'at risk' or exposed to risk by the 
action of other groups or individuals. Other elements of exposure include whether 
the population at risk is delineated locally (regionally), globally, demographically, 
statistically (randomly) and whether the risk is continuous, time dependent or 
cumulative in nature. Very often, the likely benefits resulting from a risky action will 
fall to one group while the costs are borne by a separate group. Attitudes towards 
risk depend a great deal on whether a risk is voluntary or involuntary, and also, 
whether or not the risk is seen to be fair. 
The chance of realisation is the probability that the event will occur, or the measure 
of the risk. As seen in Section 3.1, the distinction between a risky situation and an 
uncertain situation depends on the amount of information available about these 
probabilities. In general, we are concerned with uncertain situations since this type 
of situation is characteristic of environmental management problems. This is 
expanded further in Section 3.4 which discusses the type of risk, which is dependent 
upon the derivation of the probabilities. 
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The magnitude of loss represents a quantification of the different outcomes as 
shown in the decision tree in Section 3.1. This quantification may represent possible 
dollar loss in a financial or business situation, or at the other end of the scale it may 
represent the number of lives lost as a result of a chemical plant explosion. Rescher 
(1983) lists the determinants of the magnitude of the negativity (in terms of 
philosophical risk) as: 
(1) character; 
(2) extent; and 
(3) timing. 
Character refers to the type of loss: financial, environmental, injury or death, 
political etc. The extent of the loss is concerned with whom the loss is likely to 
affect, and the size of the loss. This includes specifying who or what is at risk, how 
big this group or population is, and whether it can be uniquely identified. Finally, 
examining the magnitude of a negativity involves determining when it is likely to 
occur, and its likely duration. 
Assessments of magnitude are not value free. Often we do not know what the 
potential effects are likely to be, and subjective judgements will be required. 
Attempts to compare risks need to take careful account of all these elements of the 
magnitude of the loss, and not merely the apparent negativity. For example, road 
accidents may claim 10 lives over a holiday weekend, and a mining accident at the 
same time may result in 10 deaths. The magnitudes of the two risks (driving that 
weekend and working as a miner) are not the same. Measurements of magnitude 
should include full information as to character, extent and timing. 
Naive risk estimates often ignore any attempt to quantify or evaluate the magnitude 
of the risk. Catastrophic risk is described as occurring when the probability of the 
outcome is very low, but the magnitude of the possible consequences is very great. 
An example of this is the risk of a nuclear power plant explosion in a heavily 
populated area. When there is considerable uncertainty regarding the probability 
estimates, then the magnitude of the outcome assumes greater importance in 
evaluating the total risk. 
MacCrimmon (1986) suggests that as well as the three components of risk which we 
have been discussing, there are three determinants of risk: lack of control; lack of 
information; and lack of time. He further suggests that if we had complete control 
of anyone of these determinants then we would be able to choose the best outcome 
without risk. The objective in risk management is therefore to improve our 
knowledge and control of a situation so as to reduce the inherent risk. Although 
MacCrimmon's particular application relates to business management, the principle 
is of general applicability. There can, however, be a dangerous fallacy in the control 
determinant. Often we have an illusion of control which is not borne out by 
subsequent events. This is particularly evident when voluntary risk (which financial 
risk is generally characterised as) is involved. 
3.3.1 Quantification of risk and decision criteria 
Figure 2 shows the decision tree of Figure 1 with sample numbers replacing the 
probabilities and outcomes. 
probabilities outcome 'worth' 'value' 
Pij PijXOj 
DAD ~.01' WI = 0.5 0.20 
a1 °2, W2= 3.0 1.50 
°3, W3= 5.0 0.50 
A~ 0.001 
·°4, W4= 1000 1.00 
0.999 
_°S, W5= 1.0 0.999 
Figure 2: Quantification of risk. 
WI to W 5 are numbers representing the 'worth' of outcomes 01 to 0S. A 'value' for 
each outcome can be calculated as Pij multiplied by Wj. In this example the 'worth' 
and outcomes are all positive, representing gain. It has been presented in this way 
because it is more typical of managerial decision-making problems, and also because 
the criteria used to measure success are more easily understood in these 
circumstances. 
Decision analysis uses a number of different criteria for measures of success (Baker, 
1984) for each possible choice. The simplest of these criteria is maximisation of the 
expected value. The expected value for each action is calculated as: 
EV(ai) = ~ PijWj 
1 
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The expected value for Action 1 is + 2.2, and the expected value for Action 2 is 
1.999. Therefore, the maximisation of expected value criterion which uses long run 
average results would select Action 1. 
Examples of some other commonly used criteria (Daellenbach et aI., 1983) include 
the maximax criterion which selects the action with the highest payoff regardless of 
which event may occur (that is, no probabilities are required), and the maximin 
criterion which selects the action maximising the lowest possible payoff (similarly no 
probabilities are required). In this example, both the maximax and maximin criteria 
would select Action 2. 
These criteria are associated with the decision maker's attitude towards risk. 
Maximisation of expected value is a risk neutral criterion, whilst maximax is risk 
prone and minimax is risk averse. Looking at our example, the maximum 'worth' for 
Action 1 is 5 and the maximum for Action 2 to 1000. Therefore the maximax 
criterion selects Action 2. The minimum 'worth' for action 1 is 0.5 and for Action 2 
it is 1.0. Therefore the maximin criterion selects Action 2. This rather contrived 
example is interesting because both criteria select the same action. 
Concentrating on Action two, the difficulty of using a single figure to represent a 
value of risk is seen. Multiplying the probability and the worth for Outcome 4 we get 
a value of + 1. The similar value for Outcome 5 is + 0.999. However, the character 
of each outcome is quite different. Outcome 4 has a low probability of occurrence, 
but a very high worth. Outcome 5 has a high probability of occurrence and a low 
worth. This shows one of the major limitations of the expected value criterion which 
cannot distinguish between the two cases. 
This example can also be worked with negative outcome values. This would be more 
representative for an example where risk to health or the environment was 
concerned. 
3.4 Types of risk 
How do we measure risk in the real world? Several authors describe the different 
ways in which risk may be measured. The best description is given by Starr et al. 
(1976). They define four measures of (future) risk. 
(1) Real risk: determined eventually by future circumstances when 
they develop fully. 
(2) Statistical risk: determined by currently available data, typically 
measured actuarily. 
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(3) Predicted risk: predicted analytically from systems models 
structured from historical data. 
(4) Perceived risk: seen intuitively by individuals. 
Statistical risk and predicted risk are often called objective estimates whereas 
perceived risk is known as a subjective estimate or sometimes, a personal 
probability. The differences between these types are quite subtle. Both statistical 
risk and predicted risk are derived from historical information. The difference is 
that statistical risk is based on observed frequencies which can be evaluated by 
normal statistical means whereas predicted risk is a theoretical probability valid only 
to the extent that the model from which is has been derived is able to be validated. 
They are both 'objective' probabilities and can be challenged as being irrelevant in 
one-off situations. 
Real risk is often never able to be evaluated. It can only be determined in the future 
if the risk is well defined temporally. This temporal element is very important in any 
form of risk analysis since risk is inevitably oriented towards the future. Perceived 
risk is a 'subjective' measure of risk. Commonly, perceived risk and predicted risk 
will represent maximum and minimum estimates of real risk with statistical risk lying 
somewhere in the middle. 
The distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' risk estimates will be explored 
further later in this report. It is, however, very important to remember that our 
so-called 'objective' estimates often contain considerable subjective bias as a result 
of lack of raw data and the need for assumptions in the estimation process. We have 
already mentioned this connection with the area of technical value judgements. 
Starr et al. (1976) use air transportation to illustrate the difference between risk 
types. Restating his example in a New Zealand context, the travel insurance 
company calculates the statistical risk of flying using recorded events and numbers of 
people flying, the passenger makes his own perceived risk estimate which is 
quantified when he selects the amount of insurance cover he wishes to purchase, and 
the air traffic controller uses models to estimate predicted risk. 
It is important to preserve these distinctions so that risk analysts are aware of exactly 
what type of risk they are concerned with. An example of possible confusion in 
terminology occurs when risk analysts use the term 'actual' risk. This usually means 
a statistical measure of risk. It is not real risk as defined here because it is measured 
in the past. For example, the actual risk of a ski-ing injury could be measured as the 
total number of injuries in a particular (past) year divided by the number of skiers in 
that same year. It is relevant only to the specific period for which it has been 
calculated. If this measure of risk is used to predict the number of accidents likely to 
occur in the future then it becomes statistical risk, not real risk. Some analysts use 
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the term actual risk as if it were synonymous with real risk (which in this case would 
be the fraction of injuries occurring in the current year, which can only be measured 
after the risk has been incurred). 
Statistical estimates of risk are used when there are sound statistical data available 
for the particular event being studied. In this way, we can make reasonable estimates 
of the risk to the child from a mother smoking during pregnancy (using long run 
average frequency estimates). The difficulties arise when, for example: 
(1) the historical data being used is not sufficiently specific for the 
purpose for which it is being used; 
(2) the data does not cover a sufficiently long period; 
(3) the estimate obtained is applied to a different population to that 
from which it was derived; or 
(4) the probability of occurrence is very low. 
These problems are well known to statisticians, however, unfortunately the statistics 
are still often misused. When these inadequacies are recognised, predicted risk 
estimates obtained by systems modelling can be used. These estimates require 
additional subjective assumptions to be made. 
Very small probabilities pose considerable difficulties when estimating risk, 
particularly when they are combined with potentially catastrophic outcomes. The 
classic example is the risk of a nuclear power plant accident. The probability of the 
occurrence is very small, but the hazard is immense. Statistical measures are 
inappropriate, because historically there have been very few occurrences. 
Risk estimates for this type of eventuality can be made using predictive models and 
reliability data. Event tree and fault tree analyses are used to determine possible 
ways of breakdowns occurring, and reliability statistics are used to evaluate the 
sequences, and predict risk of failure. Historical data in the form of reliability figures 
are the basis of the estimates. This type of modelling involves evaluating all possible 
events and outcomes, including complex interactions between subsystems. There is 
always considerable uncertainty involved because of the difficulty in ensuring that 
all possible outcomes are considered, and because of the difficulties in 
incorporating the possibility of human error, which to date is the most common 
cause of such failures. 
Some risks are considered to be so small that they are called 'effectively zero risk' 
and are treated as being negligible. The difficulty is in determining what level of risk 
can be tre~ed in this manner. Unless the magnitude of the outcome is also small, 
we must be very sure of the accuracy of the risk which we label as being effectively 
zero. Statistical risk estimates have poor reliability in cases where events are of very 
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low occurrence. Therefore predicted risk estimates are generally used. These are 
based on subjective judgements and assumptions which must be carefully evaluated 
before the effectively zero risk judgement can be made. This judgemental aspect of 
risk decision making is considered in more detail in Section 4.4. 
Even so called objective risk estimates are not necessarily consistent with one 
another. Two experts using the same base information can arrive at quite different 
estimates of risk for a particular risky action. This can be a common occurrence. 
Some of the reasons for this are: that all the relevant data may not be available and 
may have to be estimated; there may be moral and ethical differences in the 
attitudes of different analysts which will affect the assumptions made; and estimates 
will vary according to who is likely to be affected. 
3.5 Risk factors 
Freedman (1987) introduces the concept of a risk factor as "something which causes 
a risk". His example is smoking, where the action of smoking is the risk factor and 
the chance of developing lung cancer is the risk incurred. In our terminology the 
hazard is lung cancer. This distinction is quite consistent with the definitions of risk 
used in this paper and adds depth to the concept of risk as a probability of 
occurrence and a magnitude of outcome. The recognition of risk factors is 
particularly useful later when we discuss acceptable risk and risk thresholds. 
'. 
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4.0 Approaches to risk - what is risk analysis? 
Chapter 3 has provided an introduction to the more practical aspects of risk analysis. 
Chapter 4 uses the background material of Chapter 3 as a basis for exploring 
practical risk analysis. The first section in this chapter looks at risk perception. Risk 
perception is not only concerned with 'perceived risk' which we have mentioned in 
Section 3.4, but with all aspects of individual and group perceptions of risk. The 
factors relating to perceptions of risk are particularly relevant to the applied areas of 
risk assessment and risk management, which are considered later in this chapter. 
Risk perception is also a key element of any attempted evaluation of acceptable risk. 
Acceptable risk problems are decision problems because they require choices 
between different courses of action. They are also value laden, involving trade-offs 
between a variety of considerations concerned with societal well-being. 
There is some difficulty in deciding how to group the various topics in this chapter. 
Risk perception is described first, because it is important to our understanding of all 
areas of risk analysis. We must be constantly aware that perceptions of risk vary 
according to the source of the risk, and the identity of the risk taker(s) and the 
individuals. or population put at risk. This must be accounted for during any 
evaluation of risk. There is a clear distinction between the various aspects of risk 
assessment which is both useful and important. Whilst the component parts can be 
usefully separated, they must all be present for meaningful risk analysis. We can use. 
the distinction to analyse the respective roles of the analyst and the decision maker. 
A major part of the risk assessment process, and in particular risk evaluation, is 
concerned with acceptable risk. There is considerable controversy regarding some 
of the calculations which have been used in this field. Some analysts believe that 
there is no such thing as acceptable risk, but only accepted risk. 
Risk management is an even less well-defined area. Theoretical risk management is 
concerned with examining policy options and setting and using decision criteiia to 
determine the 'best' proposal. Practical risk management considers the results of 
such decision analyses in view of social, political and cultural realities. An integral 
part of risk management should be the implementation of the selected option along 
with the constraints placed on the process by the evaluation procedure. Most 
projects which have been the subject of quantitative risk assessments also require 
extensive monitoring and control. The risk assessment should therefore include 
details about the way in which this monitoring is to be done, who is responsible for it, 
and allow for flexibility in the implementation process as new information becomes 
available. 
·~17-
4.1 Risk perception 
The variance between perceived risk and actual risk has been the subject of a large 
number of books and papers, mainly as an introduction to the problem of assessing 
risk. The distinction is sometimes made as being between 'subjective' and 'objective' 
probabilities. Although the emphasis in these studies is on risk perception there has 
in some cases been a notable misconception regarding the definition of actual risk. 
Referring to Section 3.4, there is a clear distinction between real risk (which usually 
cannot be measured) and the two so called objective estimates, statistical and 
predicted risk. Actual risk is often used as though it means real risk, whereas, in fact 
it is itself an estimate only, with its own judgements and values attached. The use of 
this term "actual" biases the reader towards the impression that it is real risk. We 
will therefore try to avoid using the word actual as a descriptor. When it is 
unavoidable the term "actual riskll is used as a substitute for statistical risk, with the 
implication that it has been measured in the past. 
Perceived risk is the individual or group, judgement or valuation of the magnitude 
and likelihood of the possible 'bad' outcomes which may result from an action. Our 
willingness to take a risk is measured by the subjective probabilities which we place 
upon the alternative actions and our judgement as to the possible magnitude of these 
outcomes, which depends upon the environment in which the actions are taken. 
Slovic et al. (1980), Griffiths (1981) and Covello et al. (1981) list some of the factors 
which affect our perceptions of risk probabilities and outcomes. 
They can be summarised as: 
(1) whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary; 
(2) whether the consequence is likely to be immediate or delayed; 
(3) whether the subject is familiar or unfamiliar with the risk; 
(4) whether the risk is known to science or not; 
(5) what measure of control over the risk the subject has; 
(6) whether it is a 'new' risk, or whether it has been previously 
experienced (not necessarily directly); 
(7) whether the effects are chronic, cumulative or catastrophic in 
nature; 
(8) whether the consequences are common or dread; 
(9) the severity of the consequences; 
(10) the size of the group exposed to the risk; 
(11) the distribution of the risk - is exposure equitable; 
(12) the effect on future generations; 
(13) the degree of personal exposure; 
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(14) the global catastrophic nature of the risk; 
(15) the changing character of the risk; 
(16) whether there is seen to be any easy way of reducing the risk; 
(17) the availability of alternatives; 
(18) the necessity of exposure; 
(19) whether the hazard is encountered occupationally; 
(20) whether it affects 'average' people; 
(21) whether there is likely to be misuse; and 
(22) whether the consequences are reversible. 
There is uncertainty associated with most of these factors. They may reflect the 
perception of the risk taker or the individual or group at risk. It is our perception of 
these factors which affects our estimate of the risk. 
Often people's risk perceptions are not borne out by accident statistics. For example, 
few of us consider driving across a railway line as dangerous, but a surprising amount 
of accidents occur on railway crossings. In the United States attempts to increase 
voluntary usage oLseat belts has consistently failed despite evidence showing 
increased chances of survival in the case of accidents. People have an 'it wouldn't 
happen to me feeling'. On the other hand a number of people have a particular fear·. 
of high places, and go out of our way to avoid them in disproportion to the statistical 
risk involved. 
Some studies, generally using psychological research methods to elicit perceptions 
have shown good agreement between perceived risk and statistical risk (Lee 1981; 
Thomas, 1981), in particular cases where the subject is asked to scale hazards and 
magnitude of severity. The main factor in this apparent contradiction appears to be 
the subject's perception of his or her degree of personal involvement. 
Fischhoff (in Covello et aI., 1981) lists six reasons why disagreements occur between 
the public and the experts: 
(1) the distinction between 'actual' and 'perceived' risk is 
misconceived; 
(2) lay people and experts are talking different languages; 
(3) lay people and experts are solving different problems; 
(4) debates over substance may disguise battles over form and vice 
versa; 
(5) lay people and experts disagree about what is feasible; 
(6) lay people and experts see the facts differently. 
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We have addressed the first of these already. Fischhoff himself, however, is not 
particularly clear as to the distinction. Reasons (2) and (3) are questions of 
information. If the public and the experts can inform each other then the 
expectation is that the gap between the perceived risk and the statistical or predicted 
risk will narrow. This is only possible, however, if the conflict is caused by a lack of 
knowledge. 
If the conflict results from different value systems, then we come to the fourth 
reason which suggests that the problem is that lay people and experts may not want 
to understand each other: this relates to Reason 5, that they disagree as to what is 
feasible and to Reason 6 that they see the facts differently. Certainly, the literature 
enforces the opinion that the two sides may in general not want to be reconciled. 
There is a notable feeling of smugness in a number of articles and reports by 
industrialists claiming that they are adequately informing the public and that the 
problem is that the public really does not know what is good for it. On the other 
side, lobbyists may not accept the information that they are being given on the 
grounds that they have been misinformed in the past. It is futile for both sides 
simply to present their view of the 'facts' and expect the other side to accept it. They 
must be prepared to discuss and analyse the situation together to find common 
ground. Unless there is willingness to co-operate then nothing will be achieved. 
Conflict resolution is discussed more fully in Section 5.2. 
Griffiths (1981) uses the Windscale Inquiry in 1977 as an example of a circumstance 
'Where the participants were not discussing the issues on the same basis. He suggests 
that the discussion should have been about values, not facts, since the 'facts' were 
not incontrovertible. 
Public perception may also vary as to the type of risk incurred by a particular activity. 
Thomas (1981) reports the results of a survey regarding nuclear power production. 
This survey showed that people whose declared attitude was pro-nuclear power felt 
that the risks associated were physical and psychological only. People who were 
against nuclear power felt that it also imposed environmental, future oriented and 
political risk. Whether the perceptions affected the attitude or vice versa is not 
known. 
Differences in risk perceptions do not just relate to the risk estimates themselves. 
There can often be disagreement as to the role of the risk analyst in the 
decision-making process. Engineers and technologists view their task as the 
examination of a particular project or system. Their objectives are to understand the 
system, to find likely performance and failures of the components, to question the 
assumptions and to identify the weak parts by formal analysis (e.g. event trees and 
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fault trees). Their analysis is project oriented. They are not directly concerned with 
the consequences of an action and they generally avoid making value judgements. 
Unfortunately, they are sometimes placed in the position where they are required to 
answer questions concerning the 'value' of a project, which is beyond their 
professional competence. When this occurs, there can be difficulty in separating the 
objective and subjective parts of their evaluation. 
There is no general method for dealing with the differences between perceptions 
and technological judgements. Society's inputs are perceptions and values which are 
made visible through the political system, the legal system and the public's 
willingness to pay. 
People respond to the hazards they perceive and even when there is good statistical 
data available, subjective judgement is needed to interpret the estimates and results 
and to evaluate their significance (Slovic et aI., 1982). Understanding the factors 
that contribute to risk perceptions is therefore crucial to effective decision making. 
4.2 Risk assessment 
The aim of risk assessment is the choice of 'good' actions, and as such it is a 
decision-making problem. As our ability to alter our environment through 
technological change increases, the necessity for better assessment of the risks 
inherent in this new technology increases. There is a tendency to assume that this 
ability to alter our surroundings also implies an ability to control. This is not 
necessarily the case, and this perception of control can be dangerous if it is not 
acknowledged appropriately. Thus, there is increasing need for careful analysis and 
assessment of the risks and uncertainties introduced by new processes which must be 
weighed against the benefits introduced. 
This risk assessment or risk analysis as it is sometimes termed, is the process of 
identifying the risks involved in a particular activity or system, and evaluating the 
risks in terms of their societal acceptability. Figure 3 shows one way of illustrating 
the components of risk assessment. 
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risk assessment 
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Figure 3: Components of risk assessment. 
In similar terms, Lowrance (1976) describes risk assessment as defining the 
conditions of exposure (who), identification of the adverse effects (what), relating 
exposure to effect (how much), and finally, estimating the overall risk. 
Risk determination consists of the identification of all possible outcomes and their 
quantification in terms of probability and magnitude. In general, scientific and 
technological means are used to estimate the likelihoods (probabilities) and 
magnitudes of occurrence. There is often, however, considerable uncertainty 
involved in the specification of the consequences and in their valuation. 
Risk evaluation is sometimes called social evaluation (Kates, 1978) as it is concerned 
with society's behaviour, as manifest in the collective behaviour of individuals, and 
society's attitudes towards risk. Examination of this topic involves further mention 
of the theory of choice under uncertainty. Social evaluation techniques include 
benefit-risk and cost-benefit procedures. From this emerges the concept of 
'acceptable risk', and the setting of acceptable risk levels or risk thresholds. In this 
paper we have separated the two areas of risk evaluation and the determination of 
acceptable risk because of the value-laden nature of the second topic. Risk 
evaluation is concerned with analysing the risk in terms of its probability and 
magnitude. The methods of risk evaluation may require recourse to 'acceptable risk' 
levels, however, they are not themselves concerned with the calculation of these 
levels. 
Figure 3 shows risk determination and risk evaluation as separate entities. They are 
often treated independently, largely because their application requires different 
skills. However, risk assessment is a process, and any particular risk analysis must 
consist of a progression from identification to estimation and finally evaluation. As 
Griffiths (1981) suggests, it can be beneficial to differentiate between the "objective 
process of risk quantification and the essentially subjective interpretation of the 
significance of estimated risks". However, the two components as described here are 
incomplete without each other. Risk assessment can also be considered as an 
iterative process, with new information about the system derived from the evaluation 
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phase being used to reduce the uncertainty inherent in the identification and 
estimation phases. 
This process of risk assessment is not complete, however, unless the further steps of 
implementation are considered. These include communicating the results of the risk 
assessment to the decision makers, the affected parties, and the public at large as 
well as ensuring that proper controls are in place for the putting into practise and 
control of the selected options. This control may consist of a constant monitoring 
process or simply a one-off check that the restrictions imposed by evaluation are 
adhered to. 
The objectives of 'good' risk assessment as applied to physical engineering risks are 
summarised by Farmer (1981) as potential benefits: 
(1) to understand the system; 
(2) to find likely performance and failures of various plant items; 
(3) to question assumptions with particular regard to complex 
phenomena; and 
(4) to identify weak points by formal analysis. 
These objectives are equally applicable to other forms of risk that we are concerned 
with in this paper such as environmental, managerial and political risk. The first of 
these is particularly relevant. It emphasises the importance of risk identification, 
which is often overlooked. Unless there is careful attention paid to this initial step, 
then there is a real danger that the system which is 'understood' may in fact not be 
the system which is under study, in which case the most careful estimation and 
evaluation processes are meaningless. 
4.2.1 Risk identification 
Risk identification is the process of analysing the available alternatives and 
identifying all source of risk, or all possible outcomes or consequences which may 
result from each particular action. It involves the consideration of the causes or 
origin of the risk and the individuals or population at risk, as well as the definition of 
the conditions of exposure to the hazard. In many circumstances, there may be 
considerable uncertainty involved with the set of outcomes. The objective of 
identification therefore must be to carefully examine all possibilities of harm 
regardless of the likelihood of occurrence. 
In many cases the process of identifying the risk is closely linked to the process of 
estimation in that the method used for estimation may be an extension, or simply a 
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quantification, of the method used for identification. Lowrance (1976) lists a 
number of factors which are used in both identifying and quantifying risks. They are: 
(1) traditional or folk medicine; 
(2) commonsense assessment; 
(3) analogy to well known cases; 
(4) experiments on human subjects; 
(5) review of inadvertent and occupational exposure; 
(6) epidemiological surveys; 
(7) experiments on nonhuman organisms; and 
(8) tests of product performance. 
These factors are all commonly used in industrial situations to identify which risks 
are likely to be present or result from the procedure being investigated. Other 
common approaches include the setting up of scenarios, and the Delphi approach to 
group study and consensus decision making. 
In assessing the chance of failure in the construction of systems such as chemical 
processing plants, technologists commonly use event tree and fault tree analyses to 
examine and later quantify all possible routes to failure. This is in fact a scenario 
approach to risk identification, since although the objective is to examine all 
possibilities, in practice it is likely that some options will be either overlooked or 
ignored. Although not perfect, it is a careful systematic approach which arguably 
can be easily applied to a wide variety of situations. A detailed description of this 
type of analysis can be seen in Barlow et al. (1975). Further examples of specific 
methods can be found in Lees (1980). 
Here also, the identification and estimation phases are closely linked. This 
emphasises the need to 'get it right' in the first place (the identification). Additional 
information can be gained by use of iterative procedures which use knowledge 
acquired during the evaluation of the risk to reduce uncertainty present in the 
identification phase. This approach is valuable, though it often leads to greater 
uncertainty by the introduction of new variables and control factors. 
There are a number of factors related to risk perceptions which introduce 
uncertainty into the identification process. These include the possibility of human 
error, the difficulty in predicting the behaviour of complex systems, overconfidence 
in current scientific knowledge, and incomplete knowledge of the likely effects of 
actions which cannot be tested easily. The dynamic nature of risk introduces 
uncertainty. As people's attitudes and expectations change, their perception of what 
constitutes a hazard changes also. Education and greater availability of information 
are important factors here. 
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Risk identification is therefore not as objective as we would sometimes like to think, 
since the process of identification depends upon sUbjective evaluations of what 
constitutes a risk. It is in this area that 'experts' and lay people often have the 
greatest difficulty in resolving disagreements. 
Starr et al. (1976) group methods used to identify risk into three categories which 
can be summarised as "empirical evidence, statistical inference and postulation 
based upon a transfer of experience or the laws of nature". Risk identification is 
perhaps the most important part of the risk assessment process because of the 
dangers due to uncertainty if consequences are discounted or ignored. It is itself a 
decision making process with choices offered as to whether or not a risk needs to be 
included. There is no general process which can be followed for all problems, 
though experience can provide guidelines. The route which involves the greatest 
uncertainties is that described as "postulations based upon the transfer of 
experience". This method must be employed when there is no formal historical 
experience offering guidelines. Where new potential risks are involved, there is a 
temptation to discount them as negligible because of this lack of experience. The 
effectively zero risk problem has been mentioned previously. When combined with 
potentially catastrophic outcomes, then the magnitude of the risk becomes very 
great. Therefore, it must be emphasised that during the identification phase, all 
possible risks must be included. 
4.2.2 Risk estimation 
The process of risk estimation has two parts. Firstly, there is the process of 
estimating probabilities or likelihoods for each of the possible outcomes or 
consequences, and secondly there is the problem of determining consequence 
values. 
Once the set of possible outcomes has been identified, the process of attributing 
probabilities to these outcomes is often a fairly mechanical task. This is the 
"objective phase", where, whenever possible, statistical probabilities are used. 
Where it is not possible to obtain these, predicted risk estimates are calculated. We 
have already discussed the main differences between these estimates. An alternative 
approach to obtaining risk estimates, where no historical or experimental data are 
available, is to use risk comparison procedures. This is similar to the 'experience 
transfer' method of risk identification except that quantitative methods are 
employed. Risk comparison involves attempting to find an equivalent risk which is 
quantifiable, and applying the same probability of occurrence to the unknown risk. 
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We have classified an uncertain situation as one where a group of 'experts' cannot 
agree about the relevant probability estimate to apply to an event. The use of the 
term 'experts' implies some specialised knowledge relating to the event. Because of 
the uncertainties involved in risk estimation it is not uncommon for different 
'experts' with similar specialised knowledge and using the same base information to 
arrive at different conclusions regarding a specific risk. This highlights the point that 
the 'objective' probabilities obtained from historical data are not absolute, and 
reflect the perceptions of the person making the calculations. 
It is possible too that the public may perceive these risks in an entirely different 
light. If public participation is part of the decision-making process, then the 
divergence between the perceived risk and the estimated risk may be crucial. 
Therefore it is important that the process involved in the quantification of the risk 
estimates should be presented in a form that is generally comprehensible. If that is 
not possible because of the technical nature of the estimates, then the assumptions 
made in reaching those estimates should be readily available. The credibility.of the 
'expert' and the decision-making process is at stake. 
This applies also to the estimation of the magnitude of the outcomes, where similar 
techniques are used for the estimation process. As Starr et al. (1976) state, the two 
processes of estimating probability and outcomes are not completely separable as 
the degree of harm involved in the outcome often influences the implicit and explicit 
perceptions of the probability, and vice-versa. 
Methods of risk quantification are often refinements or extensions of the methods 
used to identify the risk. These approaches include quantification of the factors 
attributed to Lowrance in Section 4.2.1 as well as reliability and failure analyses, 
event and fault tree analyses and consequence modelling (Royal Society, 1983). One 
of the primary requirements for the effective use of some of these techniques is the 
availability of 'good' data: that is, reliable and robust data. There are currently a 
number of excellent reliability data banks available, with data relating to specific 
component failure as well as complex combinations. Such material, however, is not 
necessarily immune to misuse. It is important that the risk analysis remains 
sufficiently flexible that the 'expert' is able to revise the approach used, and does not 
get locked in to an inadequate description of the system being studied. 
In Section 3.3.1 we discussed the quantification of risk without mentioning the units 
used to measure risk. Because the decisions involved usually require some form of 
risk-benefit, cost-benefit analysis it is often necessary to quantify as many as possible 
of the factors in monetary units. Since risks are commonly measured in terms of 
number of injuries or deaths per unit head of population at risk, there is 
considerable pressure on the risk analyst to provide estimates of the value of specific 
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injuries and the value of life. This is also an integral part of risk-benefit analysis. As 
a result, a considerable body of literature has been developed on the 'value of life' 
discussion. 
The ways of measuring the probability of individual risk include estimating: 
(1) the number of deaths per population at risk; 
(2) the number of deaths per unit measure of the activity; 
(3) the loss of life expectancy (using life tables and demographic 
data); and 
(4) the calculation of frequency versus consequence lines derived 
from statistical records. 
All of these approaches require the availability of extensive, reliable, and relevant 
statistical information. As mentioned earlier such data is often not available in the 
required form and deductions and inferences are made. 
An important part of a number of risk estimation processes involves making 
estimates of the value of a human life. These calculations require good statistical 
information and commonly used methods include making estimates based on; 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
. . 
msurance premIUms; 
court decisions; 
human capital, in terms of discounted future earnings; 
personal risk, measured in terms of willingness to accept 
compensation for increased probability of accident; and 
implicit societal measures estimated in terms of the amount 
spent in the past to avoid accidents. 
McCormick (1981) suggests that insurance premiums are unreliable because 
insurance is designed to compensate the survivors, rather than reduce the probability 
of an accident. The usefulness of court decisions suffers because there is divergence 
and considerable inconsistency in the amounts determined. The human capital 
dPproach is socially inequitable because it does not take social value into account. It 
also requires using past data to predict future events. The difficulty with the 
personal risk approach is that the individual is assumed to know accurately the level 
of risk involved in an activity and be willing to accept anappropriate'margin-for-----
risk'. In cases such as asbestos it has been seen that individuals cannot know this. 
Lack of appropriate data is the limitation in the implicit societal method. Estimates 
are made of the number of lives assumed to have been saved by safety actions in the 
past, and this is balanced against the cost of these measures. There is obvious 
inconsistency in this approach since examples ranging from very low cost measures 
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to extremely high cost measures can be selected. Also, as McCormick points out, 
these measures refer to decisions made in the past which may not have been optimal 
in themselves. This field remains highly controversial. 
Estimates of perceived risk are also important in the risk estimation process. 
Sometimes they are used explicitly, and sometimes they are used implicitly in 
circumstances where the analyst may not recognise the subjectivity of the approach. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) discuss three heuristics that are commonly used to 
assess probabilities and predict estimates for these probabilities. These are: 
(1) representativeness, where a person or event is placed within a 
scale according to his or her (perceived) characteristics; 
(2) availability, where an estimate is made on the basis of recalled 
instances and occurrences; and 
(3) adjustment and anchoring, where an initial estimate is amended 
as increased information becomes available. 
Examples of ways these heuristics are used come to mind easily. We all use our own 
experience to make our own risk estimates. What we do not recognise often is that 
our estimates are biased as a result of selectivity in that experience, and the way in 
which we apply the heuristics. Experts also employ these heuristics, resulting in 
selectivity of statistical results, hence reducing their objectivity. 
As we have mentioned previously, risk estimation does not mean the mere provision 
of a simple numeric representing the consequence in terms of possible lives lost, 
number of injuries or land area contaminated etc.; the other factors including 
temporal and spatial distribution of costs and benefits must be included. This form 
of social accounting which has often been ignored in the past, needs to be considered 
when we proceed to the next stage of the risk management process: risk evaluation. 
4.2.3 Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation has already been called a subjective assessment as opposed to the 
objective estimates of risk determination. However, it has also been shown that the 
so-called objective estimates often contain substantial value judgements. Risk 
evaluation is an evaluation of the significance of the estimated risk (Griffiths, 1981), 
or an attempt at a reconciliation of technological and social systems. 
Looking at risk analysis in a decision making context, risk evaluation is the step 
where selected criteria are applied to a project before making a decision about 
whether it should proceed or not. The criteria used in this context can be either 
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purely quantitative, such as those introduced briefly in Section 3.3.1, or partly or 
wholly qualitative, depending upon risk perceptions. 
Rowe (1980) in "Society, technology and risk assessment" (ed. J. Conrad), classifies 
methods of risk assessment into four groups. These are: 
(1) risk comparison methods; 
(2) cost-effectiveness of risk reduction; 
(3) cost-risk-benefit balancing; and 
(4) meta-systems. 
Fischhoff et al. (1980) use a similar classification for methods of determining 
acceptable risk. Risk comparison approaches compare the risk under study with 
other risks, benchmarks, or criteria to determine an 'acceptable' level of risk. In 
general maximum levels of acceptable risk to both individuals and groups are set, 
and the 'new' risk is compared with these. The main differences in these methods 
depend upon whether 'actual' risk or 'perceived' risk estimates are used. Early 
approaches to risk comparison involved primitive comparisons with other risks in 
society. Starr (1969) made the first attempt at a statistically-based qpproach. Later 
approaches have expanded upon his work and introduced other methods including 
measurements of social response. This will be discussed further in Section 4.3. 
The cost-effectiveness of risk reduction approach compares the value of the risk 
with the cost of reducing the risk. Rowe lists four factors that have been used to 
define possible actions for reducing risk. These are: technology limits, the value of 
the lives saved, pure economic factors, and economic plus other incentives. There is 
considerable literature examining the 'value of life' discussion which has already 
been mentioned, and which will be further discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
The cost-risk-benefit balancing approach involves the weighing of all direct and 
indirect costs against all direct and indirect benefits. The difference to the cost of 
risk reduction is that in that case only direct costs and benefits are considered. The 
difficulties of this type of approach are well understood. The main limitations 
include the problems of non commensurate scales, distortions due to aggregation, 
and equity problems relating to the distribution of the costs and benefits. 
Rowe's final class is meta-systems, where combinations of approaches are used. He 
develops one example of this approach and also presents some examples of current 
usage. 
The discussion following Rowe's paper (Conrad, 1980) concurred that Rowe had 
managed to cover most currently used approaches. There was a suggestion 
-29-
(Jennergren, L. Peter, 1980) that although these approaches were all in common use, 
there was considerable disagreement as to their efficacy and applicability. This was 
in fact foreseen by Rowe who, in his summary, proposed that "it is evident that no 
single method or process works in all situations. It may well be that the process of 
risk assessment itself is more important than the method or particular approach 
used. The visibility of the process and the explicit attention given to all aspects of 
assessment may be the only underlying paradigm". 
Von Winterfeldt (in Conrad, 1980) replied by proposing a set of hypotheses for what 
should be done in the form of requirements for 'good' risk assessment. (In all cases, 
by using the term risk assessment these authors are referring primarily to what we 
are calling risk evaluation.) These are: 
(1) for whom is the risk assessment (evaluation) being done, and for 
what purpose; 
(2) risk assessment should be used for specific institutions and ends 
rather than for purely information purposes; 
(3) risk assessment should be seen to be part of a comprehensive 
analysis, rather than a separate approach; and 
(4) decision making with regard to problems involving risk needs to 
be adapted to the political and institutional requirements of this 
process. 
These proposals are consistent with the benefits of 'good' risk assessment as 
described by Farmer (1981) and included in Section 4.2, and thus there is general 
agreement that no one method of risk evaluation is valid for all applications. 
However, in a regulatory environment it may be desirable that a general approach be 
adopted. If this is required, then these 'factors' should be considered in defining the 
approach. 
4.3 Acceptable risk 
"It should be a crime to represent nuclear sites as 
hazardous sites, a crime to represent our good friends and 
colleagues in industry as being wicked people who simply 
want to poison us, blow us up or assume they can go 
ahead with their industry with total disregard to the 
benefits of the public." 
C.W.F. Fairfax, North Western Regional Health 
Authority (Scientific and Technical Studies, 1981). 
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Fischhoff (1978) defines acceptable risk in the following way: 
"The acceptable level is the level which is 'good enough', where 'good enough' 
means that you think the advantages of increased safety are not worth the costs of 
reducing risk by restricting or otherwise altering the activity." 
The Royal Society Report (1983) suggests that this definition has been implicit in 
government and industry in Britain for a long time, but that recent advances have 
resulted in attempts to quantify and publicise acceptable risk. As an alternative 
definition they propose that acceptable risk is based on the assumption that "there is 
a non zero level of probability of occurrence of an accident below which the public 
as a whole is willing to accept the risk; at this level there will be no bar to direct 
involvement or endorsement of the activity". 
What this is in fact saying is that once a risk has been identified then a decision must 
be made as which level, if any, should be allowed or persist, or be deemed 
'acceptable'. In' recent years, the determination of acceptable risk has turned 
towards the development of quantitative models which are used to set numerical 
levels below which any estimated risk is said to be acceptable. A common approach 
is to place 'known' risks on a scale and to rate the acceptability of 'new' risks by 
estimating their equivalent numerical value and placing it alongside this scale. . 
Rowe (Goodman and Rowe, 1979) describes a set of conditions which he suggests 
support the existence of acceptable risk. They are: 
(1) risk which is perceived to be so small as to be deemed negligible; 
(2) risk which is uncontrollable or unavoidable without major 
disruption in lifestyle; 
(3) acceptable risk levels established by a credible organisation with 
responsibility for health and safety; 
(4) historical levels of risk which continue to be an acceptable one; 
and 
(5) risk which is deemed worth the benefits by the risk taker. 
He refers to these as the threshold condition, the status quo, the regulatory 
condition, the de facto condition and the voluntary balance condition. These are 
examples of risks which we argue should be termed accepted risks. We further 
contend that there is no such thing as acceptable risk, but only accepted risk, and that 
this is what is commonly meant by the term acceptable risk. 
The determination of acceptable risk is an integral part of the process of risk 
assessment. Acceptable risk problems are decision problems because they require a 
choice between different causes of action, but they differ from other decision 
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problems in that one of the available alternatives involves as a consequence a threat 
to life or health. This threat may be either direct, with obvious consequences or 
indirect, being a threat to something which we value as a part of our quality of life. 
Fischhoff et al. (1981) modify Fischhoffs earlier definition by saying that acceptable 
risk is a useful descriptor for a type of decision-making process but that it is not 
appropriate for describing the results of that process. Thus, risks are not acceptable 
but options are. Having said this, he lists a series of difficulties associated with 
considering the acceptable risk problem as a decision-making problem. These are 
not unique to the acceptable risk problem, and include the uncertainties involved in 
defining the problem, assessing the 'facts' of the matter, assessing the relevant 
values, dealing with the human element, and finally in assessing the quality of the 
decision. 
Rothschild (1978) reported in the Listener, implies that the concept of acceptability 
must be related to other risks which are implicitly accepted by individuals in their 
lives. He sets his acceptable risk explicitly at 1:7500 per year of exposure, using car 
accidents in 1974 as a reference point. His approach was based on work by Inhaber 
(1978 and 1982), and the Rasmussen report (United States Atomic Energy 
Commission, 1974). In a similar manner the Rasmussen report confidently predicts 
nuclear accidents will occur at a rate of 1 in 1,000,000 for accidents involving 1000 or 
more fatalities (based on a group of 100 reactors) and goes on to equate this to the 
risk of a meteor striking a major United States city and causing the same number of 
casualties. 
All of these works have been severely criticised on a number of grounds. This 
criticism has highlighted the difficulties involved in transferring risk acceptance 
from one activity to another without taking account of the factors involved in risk 
perceptions, and the implicit subjectivity attached to the perceptions of different 
types of risk. Rothschild, Rasmussen and Inhaber have shown an alarming 
dependance on statistics derived from quite questionable sources, and have 
disregarded the need to quantify risk with regard to all the factors involved in risk 
magnitude. A first reaction to these baldly presented numbers is that they are 
meaningless in terms of the risks faced by individuals and groups as part of their 
everyday existence. 
There is obvious difficulty with this type of risk comparison approach which equates 
the risk of nuclear accident to the risk of the increased likelihood of getting lung 
cancer as a result of an individual smoking one cigarette in a lifetime (The Listener, 
1987). In effect this is saying that nuclear power plants are perfectly safe. The 
comparison is invalid. Another similar comparison which is often quoted is that 
windmills are considerably more dangerous than nuclear power plants. The source 
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referenced is Inhaber's work, which uses incomplete and poorly extrapolated data. In 
both cases, the magnitude of the total risk is not considered. 
One of the major critics of Inhaber's work is John Holdren (Holdren et aI., 1979). 
Inhaber based some of his calculations on Holdren's earlier work on energy sources. 
The statistical basis he used for these estimates is invalid which means that his 
results must be discounted. 
However, McCormick (1981) suggests three things which can be learnt from 
Inhaber's work. These are: 
(1) it is important to account for risks from producing the materials 
used to construct an energy production system (this was 
apparently a new departure and illustrates the importance of 
careful risk identification); 
(2) it is difficult to perform an accurate comparative risk assessment 
between technologies with ill-defined and incomplete data (no 
consensus between experts); and 
(3) more needs to be done to assess accurately the comparative risks 
between energy production methods. 
While some of Inhaber's work is interesting and valuable, it is best read III 
conjunction with the criticism which it generated. 
A further point with regard to typical cost-benefit analyses or cost-risk-benefit 
analyses of nuclear power plants is that generally they ignore the large cost of 
decommissioning the plant at the end of its useful life, and as a result of the use of 
high discount rates, the cost of disposal of hazardous inaterials generated by the 
process is seldom considered to be a serious factor. Both these problems have 
begun to be recognised as a result of the present decommissioning of the original 
Windscale plant in Britain, and increasing difficulties with regard to nuclear waste 
dumps. 
Uncertainty is a very important factor in the consideration of acceptable risk and risk 
comparisons. Some apparently 'accepted' risks are totally unknown or unsuspected. 
A classic example used to illustrate this type of risk is the Love Canal in New York 
State, where development took place on the site of a disused chemical dump as a 
result of inadequate monitoring. Further evidence to hand from British experience is 
beginning to suggest that there is a danger of leukaemia from very low levels of 
radiation which have previously been considered harmless: levels such as might be 
experienced by people living in close proximity to nuclear power plants. 
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A recent report from the National Radiological Protection Board in Britain (The 
Guardian, 1987) suggests that current exposure dose limits are too high, and should 
be reduced to one third the present level. This results from further evidence from 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and was confirmed by the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection meeting at Como in Italy two months previously. 
Interestingly, the latter body, although reaching a similar decision with regard to the 
risk to health decided that a reduction in the 'safe' level was not warranted. This 
illustrates two points: firstly, that science does not provide absolute answers, and that 
scientists must be flexible enough to revise their estimates, and not be overconfident; 
and, that in the particular case of nuclear safety, our present knowledge is very 
limited, and that we have remarkably little information about the effects of long 
term exposure. 
The dilemma becomes not what is an acceptable risk, but what is a fair or equitable 
risk. To whom is the risk acceptable: the policy makers, or those who have to bear 
the risk? How can we increase the fairness of risk? 
Further confusion arises when scientists use the term 'safe' to describe a risk 
situation. There is no such thing as a safe risk. What they are doing is describing 
'permitted' or 'tolerated' levels of risk (accepted versus acceptable). 
Probably the most commonly used term in the acceptable risk literature is 
'reasonableness'. On its own it has very little meaning. Lowrance (1976) lists a 
series of criteria for reasonableness, which we have summarised here as: 
(1) custom of usage; 
(2) prevailing professional practice; 
(3) best available practice, highest practicable protection, lowest 
practicable exposure; 
(4) degree of necessity or benefit; 
(5) the Delaney principle (US Food and Drug Act, non 
carcenogenic ); 
(6) no detectable adverse effect; 
(7) toxicologically insignificant levels; and 
(8) the threshold principle (the definition of a dose below which no 
appreciable harm occurs). 
These criteria emphasise the point that no determination of acceptable level of risk 
is valid without consideration of the expected benefit. 
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In Section 4.2.3, Rowe's four methods for assessing risk were listed and described. 
All of these approaches are used for the setting of acceptable risk levels. Fischhoff 
et al. (1980) describe them as follows: 
(1) risk aversion, which involves the maximum reduction or risk 
possible with little or no comparison with other risks or with 
benefits -standards of zero tolerance and dose-consequence 
threshold levels are examples; 
(2) risk balancing (corresponding to Rowe's risk comparison 
method), assumes that some level of risk above zero is 
acceptable and defines the level through comparison with 
appropriate reference cases, such as similar technologies, natural 
background levels or risk previously determined to be 
acceptable; 
(3) cost effectiveness (of risk reduction), seeks to maximise the 
reduction of risk for each dollar expenditure on safety -
acceptable risk may be set by breaks in the slope of risk 
reduction efficiency for a given hazard or by allocating public 
funds among hazards for maximum risk reduction to society as a 
whole; 
(4) cost( -risk)-benefit balancing, recognises some level of risk above 
zero, acceptable risk is defined by balancing the benefits of an 
activity or technology against the level of risk it presents - the 
risk tolerated increases proportionately with the magnitude of 
the benefits involved. 
Fischhoff has included an additional category of risk aversion. It is an interesting 
category in that the risk is not related to the benefits or costs associated with the 
action. 
Once again, none of these approaches provides a completely adequate solution, and 
further, that risk to human health is only one value dimension of acceptability; a 
variety of other considerations (equity, impact upon institutions, ecological impacts) 
may take on greater importance in any given case. Also, societal values change and 
what is viewed as being safe today may be viewed as being unsafe tomorrow (as 
previously discussed with regard to the setting of limits on occupation levels of 
radiation). Judgement on acceptability involves the consideration of perceived risks 
and benefits in light of feasible alternatives. 
Moving therefore from these 'objective' approaches to the setting of acceptable risk 
levels we enter the area of psychometric risk acceptance analyses. The shortcomings 
of the objective approaches are that they do not take full account of the dimensions 
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of risk which include: the temporal limits, who is affected, how people respond to 
reduce risk, the difference between accepted and acceptable risk, and the way in 
which individuals arrive at decisions. Psychometric and sociological studies which 
estimate perceived risk increase our understanding of how particular benefits are 
seen by individuals and specific groups. 
Starr (1969) and Starr et al. (1976) reject the disregarding of any risk below a 
particular level and claim that models should take account of tradeoffs between risk 
to establish risk benefit tradeoffs. Their approach involves the use of revealed 
preferences. Otway and Cohen (1975) followed this approach but were unable to 
duplicate Starr's results and concluded that the methodology and results were very 
sensitive to the assumptions made and the data used. Starr, himself, put a great 
many provisos on his results. The use of revealed preferences and expressed 
preferences to improve understanding of risk perceptions is discussed further in 
4.3.2. 
Determining acceptable risk involves examining the difference between people's 
perceived risk and the techologist's estimated risk. 
There is no obvious way of dealing with these differences. It is perhaps useful 
therefore to look at ways in which we can me~sure perceptions as a means of 
understanding better the way in which these differences arise. 
Lee (1981) states that it is specious to assume that the differences between objective 
and subjective estimates of risk can be attributed to errors or bias by ordinary 
people. One of the major reasons for this is that risk is not a simple quantitative 
measurement but a compound of the probability of occurrence of a negative event 
with the severity of that event. Evaluation of the severity requires consideration of 
human values and emotions. A further cause of differences arises because 
subjective estimates are usually based on mortality statistics. Death may not 
necessarily be the most feared phenomenon, and Lee uses as an example the 
thalidomide tragedy where very few lives were lost, but a large number of people 
suffered considerable decrease in their quality of life. 
A further example of this is found in Slovic et al. (1979) where it is shown that 
although lay people (in common with experts) are reasonably accurate in estimating 
expected fatality rates, their judgements of risk are coloured by factors other than 
the simple statistics. Risk means more than fear of death as represented by a 
numenc. 
Slovic (1986) looks at the difficulties people face in making unbiased estimates of 
risk in regard to risk communication. He discusses in particular, the influence of the 
-36-
media, the way in which recent events and experiences colour perceptions, the fact 
that people's beliefs are difficult to modify, however inaccurately formed, and the 
ease with which it is possible to manipulate people's views (unformed) by varying 
presentation format. 
One of the more interesting studies in this area is reported by Fischhoff et al. (1978) 
where psychometric techniques were used to elicit estimates of perceived risk, 
acceptable risk and perceived benefit. The study group was an educated informed 
section of the League of Women Voters. The most interesting result was the 
consistent relationship between perceived benefit and acceptable level of risk. This 
is consistent with our early statement that you cannot separate determination of 
acceptable risk from the expected benefit. 
The quotation at the beginning of this section highlights the size of the rift between 
the technical experts and the lay public. Fairfax was directing his comments primarily 
at the press. The press, or media in general, however, are only expressing the fears 
and concerns of the general public who either do not understand the opinion of the 
experts or, as a result of previous experience, do not believe or trust the information 
they are being given. If a concept such as acceptable risk is to exist and be 
'acceptable' then both "objective" and "subjective" assessments of risk are valid, and 
interested parties in risk debates must work together to try to achieve a common 
basis for discussion. 
4.3.1 Risk comparisons 
The risk comparison approach to setting acceptable risk levels depends on setting 
maximum and minimum levels of risk to individuals using known and accepted risk 
levels as a scale of reference. The 'new' risk is then estimated and deemed 
acceptable or unacceptable according to where it lies in this risk scale. 
There are two ways in which risk can be measured: 
(1) objectively - using historical statistical data or modelling 
projections; and 
(2) subjectively - using perceived risk estimates and preferences. 
Risk comparison is a form of extrapolation and there are a number of obvious 
difficulties associated with its use. As we have already stated, the setting of an 
acceptable risk level involves a number of value judgements. If objective risk 
estimates and referents are used, there is considerable subjectivity involved (even 
ignoring the problems of taking account of all aspects of magnitude). There is a 
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danger that the risk analyst and expert may forget the subjective nature of "objective" 
estimates. Lord Rothschild's estimate (Rothschild, 1978) is a classic example of this. 
In using road accident deaths as a referent for acceptable risk (employing the logic 
that since people are prepared to drive they must be prepared to accept this level of 
risk), he has forgotten to take account of the different factors involved when people 
choose to drive a car and when they are forced (by economic circumstances, or 
through ignorance) to take occupational risks. He has also ignored the other factors 
associated with risk magnitude which affect risk perception and the choices people 
make. These must also be taken into account if valid risk comparisons are to be 
made. 
As an example of the difficulties involved with risk comparison, we look at the work 
of Burton et al. (1978) who address the problem of natural hazards and conclude 
that there is no appropriate way of comparing the magnitude of different types of 
natural hazard. It is often not possible to conveniently compare two events even of 
similar type. Earthquakes are an example of this. There are two common scales 
used to measure earthquakes: the Richter scales measures the energy release and 
the modified Mercalli scale measures the effect on man and structures. Both aspects 
are very important to quantifying the risk involved in an earthquake, however, if two 
earthquakes are measured with similar magnitude on one scale, their magnitude 
measured on the other scale may be quite different. This illustrates the complexity 
of natural hazards. 
With this warning in mind, there are times when the risk comparison approach can 
be both useful and valid. This is when a 'new' risk can be shown to have similar 
characteristics to other risks for which we have good statistical information and from 
which we can construct a suitable scale of reference. 
Starr (1969) was the original proponent of using economic data to reveal patterns of 
socially acceptable risk trade-offs. Later, utility-based approaches were used to try 
to assess the decision maker's expectation of social utility. 
Ideally, we should be flexible enough to change our determination of acceptable risk 
as new information becomes available. We have already mentioned the recent 
report from the British National Radiation Protection Board recommending 
immediate modification of working practices at British nuclear power plants as a 
result of new information from Nagasaki and Hiroshima. (This illustrates the 
importance of monitoring.) There are several 'giant strides' between the discovery 
of this type of new evidence and the putting into practice of such a recommendation 
(altering the regulations). If acceptable risk has been determined properly and 
equitably in the past then it is hard to see why scientists attending the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection meeting at Como in September 1987 should 
-38-
have firstly accepted the new evidence but consequently decided that dose limits did 
not require amendment. The public finds this logic difficult to follow. 
4.3.2 Preferences 
A second approach to the problem of determining acceptable risk, which was 
developed as an extension of the naive risk comparison approach, used utility-based 
methods to assess the decision maker's expectation of 'social utility'. 
There are three types of preference present in most decision-making problems: 
value, time and risk. They all represent judgements of the decision maker or 
individual. Value preferences are the concern of multiple attribute theory; time 
preferences refer to discounting concepts and rate of return; and risk preferences 
are risk attitudes and relate to concepts of utility or wealth. Our concern is with 
these risk preferences. 
It has been generally accepted by behaviouralists that overall, people act in a risk 
. averse manner. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), using prospect theory, 
have shown that people tend to react in a risk averse manner when certain gain is 
involved and as risk takers when faced with certain loss - in particular when very low 
probabilities are involved. The experiments from which these deductions were 
made were associated with financial gain and loss. A further conclusion was that 
people tend to discard components shared by all the prospects, which leads to 
inconsistency when choices are presented in different ways. This occurs with both 
sophisticated and naive respondents. As a result Kahneman and Tversky have 
developed a method which assigns weights to gains and losses rather than fixed 
assets. Probabilities are replaced by decision weights. 
Whilst this approach is a useful addition to the risk analysts tools, and the attitudes 
exhibited should be borne in mind, it does not necessarily follow that these attitudes 
are likely to occur in areas where health and safety are involved. 
There have been a number of approaches employed in the measurement of 
perceived risk. These are generally classified as the revealed preference, implied 
preference and expressed preference methods (Crouch and Wilson, 1982). 
The revealed preference method, initially proposed by Starr in 1969, is based on the 
assumption that society has adjusted to a balance of risk and benefit that it finds 
acceptable. Rowe (1980) represents this as a nearly optimal balance. A second 
major assumption is that this balance is static and will continue into the future. 
Statistics of behaviour are then used to infer underlying preferences. Two further 
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assumptions are involved in this approach: firstly, that costs and benefits can be 
measured in the economic market place; and secondly, that people have sufficient 
information available to them to make intelligent (rational) choices. A major 
limitation of this approach results from the assumption that past accepted levels of 
safety are applicable to the future. These levels are based on current income 
distribution, social structures and value systems which mayor may not be desirable. 
But society does not have a fixed set of values: value systems are dynamic, as can be 
seen by the increasing concern about risk in our everyday environment. Apart from 
this the method has considerable measurement difficulties which have been pointed 
out by Otway and Cohen (1975) and others. 
The method of expressed preferences involves questioning individuals and eliciting 
information directly. There is thus no need to convert values into dollars as is 
required in the revealed preference method. The main assumptions are that people 
understand the questions they are being asked, that they are given enough 
information to make an informed answer and that their behaviour is rational and 
consistent. This method has been used by Fischhoff et aL (1977, 1978, 1980). 
Implied preferences are ascertained by looking at the institutions which society has 
set up with regard t'O risk in the past. These standards reflect current values and 
imply tradeoffs between costs, risks and benefits. Rowe (1980) sees this approach as 
a compromise between the revealed and expressed preference approaches. 
In summary, the revealed preferences approach uses statistics of behaviour to infer 
underlying preferences, whereas the expressed preferences approach elicits 
information directly from individuals. 
McCormick (1981) suggests that a revealed preference study is "an adequate guide 
of people's perceptions" only if you believe that rational decision making should be 
left to experts who use past policies as a basis for prescribing future actions. 
Expressed preference studies will therefore be effective only if you believe that 
people's present opinions should be the primary basis for decision making, and also, 
if you believe that people act on their expressed preferences. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) describe a further 'natural standards' method of 
"whatever levels of risk man and animals have lived with in the past are supposedly 
tolerable for the future". This, however, does not take account of changing values or 
of the great changes which man has already imposed on his environment which 
counter this spirit. Also, it is subject to individual or group bias which may be 
manipulated to reflect whichever version of reality the decision maker wants to see. 
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The Royal Society (1983) concludes that currently, the most favoured ways of 
analysing risk involve the use of revealed preferences, cost effectiveness (of risk 
reduction), and risk balancing. However, the validity of these methods has been 
questioned by a number of authors who believe that most people do not in fact 
tradeoff costs and benefits, but values, and it becomes a question of whether or not 
you believe that it is possible for people to make tradeoffs between positive and 
negative social values. 
There would appear to be a certain amount of vogue attached to the use of the two 
approaches to eliciting estimates of perceived risk: implied preferences and revealed 
preferences. A number of researchers are currently working in this area, and their 
work should be followed. A small applications study under New Zealand conditions 
is proposed in chapter 8. 
4.3.3 Value of life 
We have touched upon the main methods used to value life for risk assessment in 
Section 4.3.2, and mentioned the difficulties associated with each approach. Lord 
Ashby (1978) makes a strong philosophical argument against cost benefit analysis by 
saying that "in order to quantify a fragile value you have to simplify it. This divests it 
of the essence of the value you are quantifying, so that what you quantify is not the 
value you started with, but a residue of it, drained of much of its meaning." 
Most advocates of cost benefit analysis would agree that there exist some intrinsic 
values which are not completely quantifiable. The differences will arise in 
determining which elements of a project or proposal these can be attributed to. 
Most attempts at valuing life are pseudo valuations or shadow prices, used to infer a 
value which can be used for the purposes of cost-risk-benefit analysis. There is, 
however, a danger that these values can be used for more than the purpose for which 
they are calculated and extrapolated to different situations and perspectives in which 
they have little validity. 
Current research in this area is very strong and it is likely that a number of new 
approaches, or strengthening of old approaches will be available soon. The 
Environmental Risk Group associated with the School of Environmental Sciences, 
University of East Anglia at Norwich is presently looking at quantitative estimates of 
value of life with a view to recommending a standardised approach. In New Zealand 
it should be possible to incorporate further research with the Accident 
Compensation Commission. 
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4.3.4 Acceptable risk as a decision-making problem 
So far, although we have looked at acceptable risk problems as decision-making 
problems, we have not considered any of the special difficulties which are associated 
with this type of public decision making. These difficulties are not unique to 
risk-related issues, but affect all public sector decisions, and require further 
consideration on their own account. We will confine ourselves to pointing out some 
of the characteristics of this type of decision making which will have a bearing on the 
approaches used in the estimation of acceptable risk. 
Public sector decision-making problems tend to be multiple objective 
decision-making problems. There is no single objective to be maximised, and often 
the units in which the different objectives can be calculated are non-commensurate. 
Also, it is very likely that in most cases of environmental risk decision making there 
will not be a single decision maker, but a group of decision makers. In all these types 
of problems the interaction between the analyst and the decision maker(s) is very 
important. Where multiple decision makers are involved, additional complications 
are introduced, particularly if the decision is to be made on a series of different 
levels, where different decision makers may have differing goals. Decision making 
must in this case be seen as a process rather than as a single step. 
Kunreuther et al. (1983) present a series of case studies of liquified energy gas 
facility siting projects in four different countries. They take the viewpoint that risk is 
a political problem. This is consistent with Douglas (1982) who states that " .. the 
problems of risk perception are essentially political" and that " .. public debates about 
risk are debates are debates about politics". ' 
We concur with this position, and feel that it is important to separate the role of the 
(risk) analyst from the decision maker or politician who must make his decision with 
the overall goal of ensuring societal wellbeing. Similarly, we agree with Wynne 
(1982) who suggests that we should study risk perceptions as part of the political and 
social organisational context in which decisions are made. 
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4.4 Risk management 
"If we don't know the risks we face how can we cope with 
unknown dangers" 
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982. 
We have used as a basis for this paper the proposition that since it is not possible to 
eliminate risks then we must try to manage risk to produce 'good' results. From the 
section on risk perception, it can be seen that understanding the meaning of 'good' in 
this context must be a major part of management. Adequate risk management 
therefore requires co-ordination of all aspects of risk including risk determination, 
risk evaluation and risk reduction. 
Druker (1973) sums up the business attitude to risk as follows: 
"To try to eliminate risk in business enterprise is futile. 
Risk is inherent to the commitment of present resources 
to future expectations. Indeed economic progress can be 
defined as the ability to take greater risks. The attempt to 
eliminate risks, even the attempt to minimise them, can 
only make them irrational and unbearable. It can only 
result in that greatest risk of all: rigidity." 
The ability to take greater risks implies a measure of control over risk. There is a 
danger in this area, that as a result of unrecognised uncertainty, control may be an 
illusion. The Titanic was sent to sea with understocked lifeboats, and with 
inadequate training for either crew or passengers because of a fake sense of security. 
It is the outcomes or actions which we do not anticipate which cause the greatest 
problems. 
In recent times, businesses have become aware that they may carry greater financial 
and moral responsibility for their products than they have previously been willing to 
accept. In other words they are becoming more aware of the full magnitude of the 
risks involved which has largely been forced upon them by the fear of litigation. 
Examples of this include the case of the Pinto car in the United States. It was 
apparently known at construction time that a design fault meant that there was a 
danger of petrol tank explosion under certain rear end collision circumstances. The 
manufacturers felt that such collisions were rare and did not warrant the high per car 
cost modification which would be required to remove the risk. However, some such 
accidents did occur and subsequent law suits against the company resulted in all the 
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cars at risk being recalled and the fault corrected. The resulting cost to the company 
was substantially greater than the original modification would have been. In this 
circumstance a calculated business risk resulted in risk to human life and subsequent 
financial loss. The company would probably argue that the risk was worth taking. 
The public counter that the risk was too high. (It would be interesting to know how 
many less cars would have been bought if the modification had been done when the 
cars were originally built, resulting in a higher initial cost to the consumer.) 
O'Riordan (1979) proposes that it is no longer possible to reduce total 
environmental risk on the grounds that any action we might take to reduce risk in 
one area is likely to introduce further risks in other areas. The nuclear versus coal 
fired power station illustrates this. If Britain does not build any more nuclear power 
stations, it will need to build more coal fired stations (ignoring the arguments of 
conservation), thus accentuating the greenhouse effect, and increasing the risk of 
polar ice cap melt and higher sea levels. 
O'Riordan further suggests that risk management has become such a specialised 
technical process that there is no chance for anyone except the technicians 
themselves to be able to understand the processes and the results. Thus politicians 
become remote from the decision since they have no proper basis for making a 
decision. A further danger arises because very often experts cannot agree 
themselves on the interpretation of a particular set of data, and decisions get made 
on the basis of the most influential scientific advice on a 'flavour of the month' 
approach. 
This is a very important point since it concerns one of the critical factors of the 
decision-making process, which is the need to clarify the distinction between the 
analyst and the decision maker. The analyst presents the material, including relevant 
tradeoffs, to the decision maker who must chose the preferred option. The onus is 
on the analyst to ensure that the material presented is properly understood by the 
decision maker. 
Scientific rationality believes that facts can be divorced from values. Political 
rationality, however, deals with what is 'good' and 'bad' for people. Because of the 
technical aura surrounding many risk questions, the public decision-making process 
faces a danger of being overcome by scientific rationality , which is particularly 
dangerous in light of the subjectivity of many of the apparently objective 'facts' 
which are part of the risk assessment process. 
Risk management in broad terms involves the examination of policy options with a 
view to decision making. Its methods generally involve valuing the associated 
variables or attributes and then setting rules for weighting and combining these 
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variables, to develop an ordered list of options. The final decision on whether or not 
a project should proceed should also use societal determinations of acceptable risk, 
which will very likely vary according to the circumstances of the risk. Since risk 
decision making is often part of the public decision-making process the option 
chosen may not necessarily be the one which would be preferred by the risk analyst 
himself. The political viewpoint, whilst taking account of all of this, may chose an 
option which might be considered suboptimal in a technical sense. Societal values 
must be incorporated into the decision-making process if we are to achieve the 
sought after 'good' solutions. 
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5.0 Experience with risk assessment 
Before we go on to examine the use of risk assessment procedures, we should recall 
our earlier definition of risk assessment. Risk assessment is a combination of the 
technical process of risk identification and estimation, and the qualitative evaluation 
of the risks. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a commonly used descriptor 
which refers only to the first part of the process of risk assessment. 
We earlier described risk assessment as being a part of the general decision-making 
process. There are two further steps in this process which we have not considered so 
far. These are: 
(1) implementation and communication; and 
(2) monitoring. 
When we examine th~ success of current risk assessment procedures, rather than 
looking at the numerous cases where no harm or hazard occurs (or has yet to occur), 
we tend to concentrate on the accidents. This is not necessarily bad o,r biased, 
because by looking more closely at areas where things have gone wrong, we can 
attempt to improve the process, so that risks are in fact reduced, or at least better 
understood by those at risk. In some countries where there is little public input into 
the planning process, it is only when an accident occurs that people become aware 
that there is a risk at all. 
Slovic et al. (1982) list a number of examples of accidents where experts have 
misjudged either the outcome or its magnitude as a series of failures on the part of 
the expert: 
(1) failure to consider the ways in which human errors can affect 
technical systems; 
(2) overconfidence in current scientific knowledge; 
(3) failure to appreciate how technical systems function as a whole; 
(4) slowness in detecting chronic, cumulative effects; 
(5) failure to anticipate human response to safety measures; and 
(6) failure to anticipate 'common mode failures' which 
simultaneously affect systems which were designed to be 
independent. 
There is a tendency amongst the proponents of technical risk assessment (QRA) to 
attribute greater reliability to their estimates than is really justified by the processes 
by which they are obtained. There is an equivalent and growing tendency amongst 
sections of the public to scepticism with regard to these same estimates. 
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Superficially, it would appear that much of the conflict between experts and 
laypeople could be resolved by a bridging of the 'information gap'. This, however, is 
only possible if the conflict is founded on a lack of knowledge. 
The media have been accused by both experts and interest groups and individuals of 
biasing reports and misleading the public about the 'true' risks involved in particular 
projects and processes. A lot of this criticism comes from experts who feel that the 
risks are being magnified by sensation seekers. Scientists are concerned about the 
headline approach to newspaper and radio reporting which gives great emphasis to 
the conclusions often ignoring the way in which these conclusions have been 
reached, and necessary assumptions. Lobbyists in turn also criticise the media on 
similar grounds. 
On the one hand, therefore, QRA is gaining greater acceptance by the technical 
community who see it as a way of objectively presenting the risks that they perceive 
in projects and processes. On the other hand, the lay public who are concerned that 
the risks that they perceive are not properly represented are demanding a greater say 
in the decision-making process. 
5.1 Quantitative risk assessment 
QRA is a commonly used technical term used to represent a systematic 
identification and quantification of the risks involved in a particular project. Typical 
procedures involve some form of event tree or fault tree analysis requiring extensive 
data in the form of reliability statistics for different components. The success of the 
approach depends greatly upon the quality of the data available. It can also be a very 
expensive process. Gilby (1987) reaches the following conclusions regarding the use 
of QRA by public authorities. In summary: 
(1) that QRA's provide useful information regarding prediction of 
probability and risk, but that opinions regarding their use by 
public authorities vary greatly; 
(2) there is agreement that the techniques are useful in certain areas 
of application, for example comparing alternative design 
solutions; and 
(3) that there is considerable question as to whether QRA's can be 
used to demonstrate compliance with specific safety standards. 
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Gilbey concludes also that greater efforts should be made to establish a basis for 
various interested parties to develop common judgements. 
One of the difficulties with specific QRA's is that because of the mathematical 
complexity involved, it is very difficult to firstly interpret the results, and secondly, to 
communicate these to the decision makers. The development of 'canned programs' 
for particular types of QRA's is of concern, since unless the person responsible for 
interpretation is fully aware of the process involved and the quality of the data being 
used, they may not be able to place proper weight on the results. 
There seems to be considerable divergence between countries in their attitude to 
risk assessment as will be discussed further in Section 6. Very few countries require 
formal risk analyses to be performed as part of the procedure involved in planning 
for new projects or the extension of old projects (the Nederlands is the only known 
country where there is such a requirement). In some countries there is an informal 
agreement that this should be done. 
In Britain, the main area where risk analysis is applied is in the nuclear power 
industry. Because of the decision-making approach used, very little information is 
available to the public. Usually it is an internal assessment only. In general, the 
public only gets access when there is an enquiry in the wake of some failure or 
accident. Although new projects and extensions do not require a formal-risk analysis, 
in most cases one is performed. There is very little public input, and the whole 
procedure has developed around an existing 'old boy' network. 
We believe that in circumstances where proposed projects may have the potential to 
cause harm to people or the environment (the things they value), that is, where a risk 
exists, that QRA should be a formal part of the decision-making process. However, 
the decision should not be made on the basis of the QRA alone, but should 
incorporate all the social and political factors which are part of the full risk 
assessment process. 
5.2 Communication, implementation and monitoring 
Communication is a very important part of any decision making process. The analyst 
must first communicate his/her results to the decision maker, who must 
communicate hislher decision to the analysts and the public. This is the first step in 
the implementation of the decision. 
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Communicating means more than publishing a technical formal report, or a set of 
figures and diagrams. Proper communication requires that the information be 
presented in a form with which the recipient is comfortable. In the age of computers 
it is very easy to produce a mass of technical information which may in truth have 
very little relevant meaning. 
The public or in particular the group 'at risk' is often either ignored or treated as 
insignificant in this communication process. Decision makers and 'experts' have a 
duty to the public (whom they represent) to provide sufficient information for the 
public to understand and accept the decision. Decision makers who are often elected 
representatives are generally more aware of this responsibility than the experts 
because of the pressure to be accountable. 
Monitoring of the decision is more difficult in that once a major project has begun, 
its momentum may make it difficult to objectively re-evaluate the original decision. 
An example of this may be seen with regard to the construction of the Clyde Dam in 
New Zealand where information obtained partway through construction suggested 
that the dam might lie on a geological fault. In this case there was considerable 
disagreement between experts as to the validity of the findings and considerable 
bewilderment on the part of the public who felt excluded from an essentially 
technical debate between experts with different viewpoints. 
On the other hand, following the Three Mile Island incident in the United States, a 
number of half built nuclear power stations were abandoned largely because of lack 
of financial support from the private sector. Although this was not a formal 
re-evaluation of the risks to human life or the environment involved in building the 
stations, it represented a re-evaluation of the financial risks by the lending 
institutions. It was recently reported that a minor utility company in the north 
eastern States has been forced into bankruptcy, largely because it was unable to 
obtain a licence to operate its recently completed new nuclear power plant. This 
indicates a large shift in public values and attitudes since it should be remembered 
that emission from the Three Mile Island plant was considerably less than the 1957 
Windscale emission which had very little impact on the public's attitude towards the 
nuclear industry. 
Another similar example is the Garrison dam project in North Dakota. Pressure 
from the Canadian government and environmental interest groups may cause this 
project to be abandoned as a result of expected environmental damage to rivers 
flowing into Canada. 
It has also recently been reported (New Scientist, 1987) that Italians have voted in a 
national referendum to abolish three laws that have until now governed the country's 
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activities in nuclear power. The practical effect may be fairly minimal, since Italy 
imports 80% of its energy, but it will likely result in Italy's withdrawal from the 
European fast breeder program. 
The lessons to be learnt from these examples are that the public does not appreciate 
being treated like a mushroom and sometimes overreacts when it considers that its 
interests and values are being affected adversely. 
5.2.1 The role of the media 
As stated earlier, the media is often criticised by experts for unnecessarily alarming 
the public by exaggerating the risks associated with drugs and pesticides or particular 
projects, or taking up 'worst case' scenarios and presenting them as real possibilities. 
The public is often more discerning than is given credit by these experts. Members 
of the public will not necessarily place blind faith in what they read or see presented 
on television unless the views presented concur with their own opinions and beliefs 
which may have been reached for entirely different reasons. Greater understanding 
of how the public reaches conclusions is required. 
The media itself answers critics by admitting that indeed, often it is biased, not 
necessarily always' against the technical expert but that the reasons for this bias are 
associated with the institutional structure of the medium in which they operate." 
Generally presentation is limited by time and space. Also, their own lack of 
technical appreciation is not helped by the way in which material is given to them, 
particularly as they are usually required to reduce the technical content for public 
acceptance. 
An example of this is that journalists are pressured into converting measurements 
such as likelihoods, frequencies, probabilities etc. into tangible facts that people can 
relate to. The nature of "what is news" affects a journalist's presentation 
(T.Williams, 1988). Slovic (1986) adds in defence of the media that the major 
difficulty faced by journalists is the inherent complexity of risk-related stories, which 
means that they have to rely on technical expert sources, often in a wide variety of 
fields. The resultant story will depend upon whoever the journalist can get to 
interpret for hirn/her, and reflect the biases of that person. The answer, therefore, 
may be to establish a group of respected and 'available' experts that journalists can 
approach for assistance. Further research in required on ways of improving the 
media's performance in this crucial communication role. 
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5.2.2 Conflict between 'actua!' and 'perceived risk' 
Dorothy Nelkin (1979) lists four major sources of controversy over science and 
technology. These are: 
(1) the realisation by members of a community that they are 
expected to bear the costs of a project which will benefit either 
an enlarged or a different community; 
(2) the fear of potential health and environmental hazards; 
(3) questions concerning an individual's freedom of choice; and 
(4) a perception of the flaunting of traditional (moral and religious) 
values. 
Whether conflict can be resolved is likely to depend upon the source of the conflict 
and the nature of the underlying perceptions of the parties in conflict. Very few 
conflicts involve a single issue, however, in cases where specific interests are the 
primary concern, then some form of compensation may result in a compromise 
solution. 
If the conflict arises from differences in values then compromise is not possible. 
Typically, in these situations, both sides will use technical information to justify a 
position which has been taken up for entirely different reasons, based on their values 
and beliefs. 
Since such conflicts can not be resolved by a compromise and no amount of data can 
resolve such value differences a major question arises as to who should be making 
the decisions. We reiterate the need to look at these questions within a political 
decision making framework. 
An example of this type of conflict is seen with reference to an article in The 
Independent (Schoon, 1987). The Nuclear Power Industry in Britain is reported as 
undertaking a 300,000 pound campaign to convince the 2/3 of women who are 
opposed to nuclear power that it is perfectly safe and in fact necessary to the next 
generation. 
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The two opposing views are summed up by the following statements: 
(1) "The Advertisements are saying that nuclear power is inevitable. 
They're short on facts and I find them rather insidious and 
dishonest." 
Stewart Boyle, national energy campaigner for Friends of 
the Earth; and, 
(2) "I think the difference between the opinion of men and women 
(only 1/3 of men oppose it) is related to the poor education 
women have in science subjects. It makes them more susceptible 
to the scare stories .... they need reassurance. Organisations like 
Friends of the Earth spend a lot of time frightening people with 
statements that are often inaccurate." 
Dr Tom Margerison, director of the Nuclear Electricity 
Information Group. 
Apart from insulting a large number of intelligent women, Dr Margerison has 
ignored the fact that such attitudes are often based on the values of the individual or 
group. He believes that information will change women's attitudes. In this type of 
value conflict it is more likely that attitudes will harden as women suspect that they 
are being singled out as a soft target. The facts won't 'soften' her attitude since it 
must be recognised that nuclear energy does carry a finite risk. The type of 
advertisement being used is not informative, and it is directed towards the emotions 
(are you hurting your children's future?) rather than the intellect. 
In cases where attempts have been made to change people's perceptions, it has been 
noted that the format used to present information is critical. This has been amply 
illustrated above. Attempts to reduce the 'perception gap' (Slovic et aI., 1982) are 
too often attempts to change the lay public's perception rather than to initiate any 
self examination of the experts own perceptions. The technical obstacles which are 
particularly relevant to the nuclear power industry are that too often there is very 
little 'fact', and that the public tends to be sceptical of estimates of rare events. 
Dramatic events have much more impact than expertise. A further psychological 
difficulty is that experts have been shown to be wrong in the past. This attitude is 
particularly prevalent in the United States where, for many years after the much 
publicised and televised moon landing, a large part of the population believed that it 
had been faked and that man had still not reached the moon. 
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There is a great deal of suspicion of technology and its advocates in the community 
which must be addressed before real progress can be made in reducing the 
'perception gap', largely as the result of serious errors in the past which include the 
PVC industry and the West Valley nuclear waste reprocessing and storage facility. 
5.3 Is there any hope? 
In a more perfect world, perceived risk and statistical risk would be the same. The 
fact that this is not the case and that the public's perception of risk is different to the 
experts' perception might suggest that risk analysis is not working. The 'perception 
gap' is due mainly to the uncertainty inherent in the real world. The area in which 
the gap can probably be more realistically reduced is that of the dilemma of 
acceptable risk. The problem is rightly a suspicion of any imposed risk which the 
public does not understand or feel that it has any control over. In these 
circumstances the expert, through the decision maker, has a duty to explain the risk 
to the public. 
Difficulties have occurred in the past which have made experts reluctant to take on 
this role. Scientists who have considered it their duty to explain risks have found that 
their 'possible' scenarios have been taken up and turned into 'probables' by the 
media and lay public. Decision makers also are often reluctant to take public 
responsibility for their decisions and prefer to imply that the experts are the ones 
who should be accountable. 
Increased scepticism on the part of the public has a positive side as it tends to lead to 
more active public involvement in the political decision-making process. We cannot 
expect politicians to make the 'right' decisions unless we give adequate indication of 
our preferences to them. There is also, unfortunately a negative side in that the 
administrative response to public opposition often leads to the future abuse of the 
system. Administrators and technocrats, having selected their project on the basis of 
economic efficiency and technical criteria, may then attempt to structure or manage 
public opinion to gain acceptance of their solution. 
Wynne (1987) suggests that it is dangerous and divisive to continue characterising 
this conflict as "science versus subjectivism", and that whilst there may be an element 
of producing figures to suit the position on the part of the technicians and 
uninformed irrationality on the part of the lay public, these factors do not fully 
explain the differences. 
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Two of his examples include the 2,4,5-T conflict and the European Commission 
decision to ban hormones for increasing meat yield. In the first case, the experts 
advice about the safety of the chemical was judged correct, and 2,4,5-T was not 
banned by the Pesticides Advisory Committee in the UK, despite reports of illness 
by farmworkers. 
The common factor in both cases was that the scientific evidence presented was 
based on laboratory experiments which demonstrated that under conditions of 
proper use there was no danger to humans. The difficulty is that these conditions do 
not prevail in the real world. As a much quoted worker's representative said in 
regard to the 2,4,5-T decision, "it was like asking someone to work in a laundry, but 
to keep out of the steam". 
In the second case, growth hormones were judged by experts to be safe under a set 
of quite stringent conditions. The rejection of their advice was greeted with outrage 
and suggestions of a "travesty of rational decision". What they were forgetting was 
that the decision about whether or not to allow use of the hormones was a social 
decision which had to take account of the way in which they were likely to be used. 
Decision makers should not be asked to make a choice between accepting objective 
and subjective risk estimates. What is required is that they should recognise that all 
objective or expert estimates contain an element of subjectivity related t6 the 
framework used to calculate them, the selection of available data and the 
assumptions made, which reflect social judgements made by the technicians. 
Decisions must therefore be based on technical risk estimates plus a knowledge of 
the real world and the likely conditions of use that will occur. This social judgement 
on the part of the decision maker should also incorporate elements of public risk 
perceptions about the proposed project. 
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6.0 Alternative approaches to risk decision making 
Risk decision making involves many aspects of the multiple objective decision-
making problem, which is concerned with making value tradeoffs. These problems 
are all pervasive and at the heart of many public policy controversies (Bell et al. 
1978). 
There are a number of different approaches taken to risk decision making in 
different countries. O'Riordan (1979) summarises these as follows: 
(1) the adversaIY approach, where a constitution encourages conflict 
and controversy which is often resolved by formal, legal or 
political means; 
(2) the consensus approach, where policy is made incrementally by 
an elaborate system of consultation and compromise; 
(3) the authoritative approach, where a great deal of authority is 
given to technicians in central government to negotiate with 
industry; and 
(4) the corporatist approach, where a mixture of different interests 
seek to find mutual advantage in collective action. 
None of these approaches is used in its pure form in any country. However, generally 
speaking, the United States, Japan, West Germany and some other European 
countries use an open adversary approach. This is slow, cumbersome and expensive, 
but is seen as being credible by the general public which has access to the process. In 
Britain, the N ederlands, some Commonwealth countries and other European 
countries, risk management is left in the hands of 'experts' and the 'old boy' system, 
following the authoritative approach. This is more efficient in terms of the time 
taken and resources required than the open adversary approach, but it is being 
severely criticised at present. The public has no access to the proceedings and often 
very little knowledge about the risks it is being exposed to. There is also 
considerable scepticism about the capability of experts to make 'good' decisions in a 
behavioural sense, and one primary reason for this is that experts consistently 
over-rate their ability to estimate objective risks. 
When the authoritative approach is adopted, the roles of the analyst and the decision 
maker become confused. The decision maker relies on the judgement of the expert 
to provide the 'best' alternative and a grey area as to the responsibility for the 
decision develops. There needs to be greater understanding of the decision-making 
process, and clarification of where the responsibility lies if the public is to continue 
to accept this type of decision-making approach. 
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6.1 Regulation versus voluntary agreements 
The process of regulation requires setting standards, monitoring, enforcing, and 
evaluating and assessing the regulatory process in terms of its effectiveness, 
efficiency, cost minimisation and fairness. Usually, the regulatory function is carried 
out by an agency which is independent of the industry. 
The alternative approach of voluntary agreements, which may be self regulated by 
the industry has been shown too often not to work. Until recently in Britain there has 
been voluntary agreement with regard to the use of a large number of pesticides. 
However, farmers have kept using some chemicals (for example DDT) despite 
recommendations against their use on the grounds that if it were really unsafe then 
the Ministry of Agriculture would ban the chemical. The Ministry, on the other 
hand, says that there have been few reported cases of illness or death from the use of 
such chemicals and therefore there is no reason to ban them. Careful study (Tait, 
pers. comm.) shows that there is substantial evidence of unreported illness, which is 
consistent with chemical poisoning. 
This illustrates the problems of lags in information becoming available to both 
parties, and a need for monitoring of the use of chemicals. 
It is also difficult to expect voluntary compliance with a nonregulated standard which 
will affect the economic wellbeing of a company. Although it had been known for 
many years that the foam fillings used in furniture were unsafe, it took a series of 
fires in which a number of children were killed to force the use of foams 
incorporating fire retardant in Britain. The indus.try was not prepared to undertake 
self regulation. 
There is apparently new interest in the practice of self regulation, however, there 
have been too many examples of areas where it has failed for it to be particularly 
credible. Otway and Peltu (1985) quote an official of the Health and Safety 
Committee, who stated that it was ''because laws without inspection did not work that 
(inspectors) were first appointed". As they also point out, there is always an element 
of self-regulation involved because it is not practicable to have continuous 
inspection. 
Regulatory policies have both normative and legitimising aspects (O'Riordan, 1979). 
That is, they are concerned with the correct way of doing things and the need for 
adequate implementation. If it is decided that there is a need to regulate for risk, 
then the regulation which is decided upon must be both acceptable and achievable. 
This overlaps with the acceptable risk problem. 
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A set of jargon has evolved in this area. Some examples of this include: 
ALARA - as low as reasonably achievable 
ALARP - as low as reasonably practicable 
BTMA - best technical means achievable 
BPM - best practicable means 
BTMA is a stricter condition than BPM, and ALARA is accepted as the guiding 
principle in controlling environmental hazards in Britain. O'Riordan (1979) 
discusses these terms in detail with particular emphasis on their legal position. 
Terms such as these are important to industry and regulatory agencies responsible 
for the setting and monitoring of these levels, but as with most jargon, they can be 
very confusing to the general public and the workers who are directly affected by 
their use. 
It must be stressed that regulation is useless unless it can be effectively monitored. 
Often companies operating under regulation will have their own belief with regard 
to the requirements for 'safety' and if they believe that the regulation is too 
stringent, they may operate right on the agreed level. This means that there is not 
only a need for monitoring of these levels, but also for vigilance about the setting 
and revising of 'dose limits' as further information becomes available. 
Regulation is becoming very complex in some areas, and a chemical plant, for 
_ example, may have a very large number of regulations associated with different parts 
of its operations. Not only does this impose substantial cost on the company, but it 
places a very large burden on the regulatory authority which has to police these 
regulations. The very complexity of the regulation makes the practice of 
self-regulation less feasible. There arises a regulation dilemma, which is likely to 
increase rather than decrease with an increasing trend towards the setting of 
international standards for safety. 
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7.0 Areas requiring further research 
In New Zealand risk analysis is in its infancy. We are spared the problems of many 
other countries in that we do not have a nuclear power industry with attendant 
problems of waste disposal. Before becoming complacent, however, we must 
recognise that we have a growing number of industrial plants which store or 
manufacture hazardous substances that are dangerous to both humans and the 
environment. One of the main problems is that these industries often seek to locate 
themselves in populated areas, close to their products' market, as opposed to nuclear 
power stations which are more often positioned in locations remote from human 
habitation (in relative terms). We also have the problem of disposal of hazardous 
materials which have long break down periods. Controversy over the storage and 
transportation of LPG has demonstrated the need for risk assessment procedures. 
Further to this, there is an increasing tendency for hazards to have global 
significance, such as the hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica and the greenhouse 
effect increasing world temperatures and possibly resulting in polar ice cap melt. 
Europe and North America are facing continental acid rain problems. 
As well as man-created hazards we are vulnerable to a variety of natural hazards 
such as earthquakes, floods, tidal waves and to a lesser extent tropical cyclones. 
Countries have in the past behaved in an isolationalist manner over their 
requirements for risk assessment, however, as the effects on the total environment 
become more apparent the need for an organised approach to risk management is 
becoming increasingly a continental and global concern. 
In New Zealand, as in most countries, there is at present no formal requirement for 
risk analysis to be performed either for new or extensions to existing projects. 
However, in a number of cases, including the recent application for planning 
permission to build an irradiation plant in Auckland, quantitative risk analyses have 
been commissioned. The danger at present in New Zealand, as well as other parts of 
the world, is that even if there is sufficient data available for a technical risk analysis 
to be performed, it is possible that there is not enough expertise and informed 
opinion to accurately"'interpret and evaluate the results (Wenman, pers. comm.). We 
stand in awe of the 'overseas expert' who in fact knows little about New Zealand 
conditions and cultural values. It is therefore doubly important that any technical 
analysis should be properly evaluated in New Zealand, and the results 
communicated to the decision makers or politicians and the general public. 
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As a step towards improving the credibility of risk analysis in New Zealand and 
improving our understanding of the process we suggest the following areas as 
requiring further study, and propose a series of small research projects. 
Risk perception 
We need to look at risk perception in the New Zealand context. A 
suggested approach would involve a small case study looking at 
revealed preferences using one prospective (Christchurch 
northern motorway) and one retrospective (LPG pipeline) 
project. 
A further study would look at a natural hazard such as the risk of 
flooding from the Waimakariri river. This could form the basis 
of a comparative study of the revealed preference and expressed 
preference approaches. 
Acceptable risk 
As an approach to the setting of acceptable risk levels, it would be 
appropriate to look at areas in New Zealand where acceptable 
risk decisions are currently being made. We then seek to 
characterise the features of acceptable risk problems, and use 
this to work out the characteristics of appropriate applications, 
and identify inappropriate uses of acceptable risk levels. 
We need to specify the objectives that an acceptable risk approach 
should satisfy. 
Value of life 
An approach to the estimation of value of life requires a full review of 
the value of life literature, and examination of the data available 
in New Zealand to make such estimates. The Accident 
Compensation Commission is likely to be a good source of data. 
There are two further aspects with regard to value of life. Firstly, what 
is the position in New Zealand with regard to liability? The 
European Commission is about to adopt a policy of strict liability 
as opposed to the previously used limited liability. Secondly, we 
need to look at the way in which Accident Compensation 
Commission determinations are used by the private sector. Are 
they used as a guideline in all circumstances? 
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Risk dilemmas 
What do you do when whatever action you take there is the probability 
of some kind of disaster? We propose a small study which would 
look at this type of situation in New Zealand and consider 
whether there need to be any general regulatory approacn 
towards such circumstances. 
Can facts and values be separated? 
As a short answer it would appear that facts and values can only be 
partially separated. We need to examine our current legislative 
procedure to ensure that this is understood and allowed for 
within the decision-making process. 
Decision support systems 
Decision support systems (DSS) have been . used overseas in some 
circumstances for the re-evaluation and monitoring of some 
hazardous circumstances. We suggest that this should be 
examined further to see if it would be appropriate in New 
Zealand. 
Policy modelling 
An examination of the ACIDRAIN policy model obtained from 
Cambridge Decision Analysts could determine whether this type 
of modelling is applicable to New Zealand conditions. We have 
been asked by the sponsors of the program to comment on its 
suitability as an aid to risk assessment. 
Flood control and water resource management systems 
Risk and uncertainty are major factors in the control of our river 
systems. Are we using appropriate methodologies for managing 
these systems? This requires a study of the institutional means 
used to admiirister and control the systems. 
-60-
Biotechnology 
The 'new' biotechnology which is developing as a branch of genetic 
engineering is likely to have major effects on agriculture over the 
next decade. The risk and uncertainties involved in this area will 
require new assessment techniques. In particular the effects on 
future generations will need specific attention. New Zealand 
decision makers need to be fully aware of the risks and benefits 
involved in these processes in order to take full advantage of the 
undoubted benefits which will accrue. We believe that a major 
study of this topic is required. 
In association with these specific topics, there is an immediate need to consider the 
requirements for the regulation and monitoring of environmental hazards in New 
Zealand. A suggested program for future research would therefore follow this 
approach: 
(1) discllssion with the Ministry for the Environment to specify areas 
where risk and uncertainty will become important in 
environmental management, using the above proposals asa 
basis; and 
(2) an examination of the current regulatory procedures followed in 
planning where risk is involved, and a comparison with 
European and North American experience. Dr Brian Wynne's 
work in this area with IIASA will provide a good base to work 
from. 
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Appendix 
Termbwlogy 
ACCEPTABLE RISK 
risk which is judged by society to be acceptable 
ACCEPTED RISK 
risk which is apparently accepted by society, for example, driving a car 
ACTUAL RISK 
scientifically calculated or experienced risk 
(usually statistical risk or predicted risk) 
HAZARD 
a harm or negative outcome 
PERCEIVED RISK 
risk as seen intuitively by individuals or societal groups 
PREDICTED RISK 
risk as measured by systems models using historical data 
REAL RISK 
risk which will be determined by future circumstances, and which therefore 
cannot be measured 
RISK 
probability of the occurrence of harm (Freedman, 1987), compounded with the 
magnitude of the harmful event 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
risk determination and evaluation 
RISK DETERMINATION 
risk identification and estimation 
RISK ESTIMATION 
the calculation of the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the 
possible outomes 
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RISK EVALUATION 
the determination of the significance or value or the risk, including study of 
risk perception and the tradeoff between perceived risk and perceived benefits 
RISK FACTOR 
something which causes a risk (Freedman, 1987) 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
the identification of all possible sources of risk and the possible outcomes from 
particular actions 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
the making of decisions involving risk and implementation of these decisions 
SAFETY 
an action is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable 
STATISTICAL RISK 
risk measured statistically using currently available data 
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